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PLURALIZING THE “SHARING” ECONOMY
Erez Aloni ∗
Abstract: The so-called “sharing” economy presents one of the most important and
controversial regulatory dilemmas of our time—yet, surprisingly, it remains undertheorized.
This Article supplies needed analysis. Specifically, the Article offers a regulatory model that
distinguishes between two separate kinds of transactions: conventional economic transactions
and those that rely on temporary access to goods and services that would otherwise go
underutilized (what I call “access-to-excess” transactions). The regulatory regime that this
Article proposes would distinguish between true access-to-excess transactions and
conventional transactions. The model is rooted in a version of pluralist theory that posits that
the state is responsible for cultivating a range of social institutions that offer meaningful
economic and social alternatives to individuals.
Recognizing access-to-excess transactions in a separate legal regime does not mean
countenancing all access-to-excess activity in an under-regulated Wild West of markets.
Pluralism has something to offer here as well: I argue that, properly understood, pluralistic
principles do not endorse free-market and hands-off policies. Rather, they require state
intervention to preserve existing choices, embed and balance diverse values (not only
autonomy), ensure fair competition, and protect consumers and employees from strategic and
opportunistic behaviors. Thus, pluralistic principles offer the normative foundation for
inventive regulation—neither conventional nor free market—that can restrain some of the
“sharing” economy’s harms without impeding innovation.
Finally, the Article reverses the lens: The “sharing” economy serves as a real-life
laboratory to reveal the operation of pluralistic theory and, thus, sheds light on the theory’s
limitations. In particular, the “sharing” economy shows how the plasticity of pluralistic
theory may enable harmful free-market policies to masquerade as “choice.”
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INTRODUCTION
“The more things change, the more they stay the same.” 1
Much tumult surrounds the rise of what commentators commonly
refer to as “collaborative consumption,” the “sharing economy,” the “ondemand economy,” the “gig economy,” 2 the “access economy,” 3 or the
“peer-to-peer (P2P) economy”—an economic activity in which web
platforms facilitate peer-to-peer exchanges of diverse types of goods and
services. 4
1. Nikos Valance, Not Your Father’s Mine: The Rosemont Copper Mine and Dry Stack Tailings,
3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 2012, at 29 n.7 (citing JEAN-BAPTISTE ALPHONSE KARR, LES
GUÊPES, vi (1849) (Fr.) (“[P]lus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.”).
2. The term “gig economy” was recently used by presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in a
speech outlining her economic vison. See Noam Scheiber, Growth in the “Gig Economy” Fuels
Work Force Anxieties, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/
business/rising-economic-insecurity-tied-to-decades-long-trend-in-employment-practices.html
[http://perma.cc/4DX5-SA56].
3. Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Sharing at All, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all
[https://perma.cc/YM9V-A4M3] (“[T]he sharing economy isn’t really a ‘sharing’ economy at all;
it’s an access economy.”).
4. As I detail in section I.A., infra, there are many misconceptions about what this economic
model entails, and its name. To avoid this pitfall, I call this model the “peer-to-peer” economy, or,
in short, the “P2P” economy. I use this term generally to address an economic model in which forprofit web platforms or mobile apps facilitate peer-to-peer exchanges of goods, services, space, and
money.
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People agree on little about this economic model—everything from
its name to its claimed virtues—is a cause for fierce controversy. 5 In
fact, people have greeted the rise of the P2P economy with sharply
polarized responses. Opponents file lawsuits concerning labor law
violations 6 or zoning regulations, 7 confront P2P firms companies with
huge demonstrations across the globe, 8 and strongly urge lawmakers for
direct regulation. 9 Proponents tout the model as innovative, choiceenhancing, and transformative of consumerist models, and exhort
lawmakers to let it flourish with minimal or no regulation. 10
What everyone does agree on is that this model has a powerful;
economic effect on various industries and employment structures; 11 and
that it is here to stay. 12 For example, Uber, the P2P transportation

5. See, e.g., Koen Frenken, Toon Meelen, Martijn Arets & Pieter van de Glind, Smarter
Regulation for the Sharing Economy, THE GUARDIAN (May 20, 2015, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/may/20/smarter-regulation-for-thesharing-economy [https://perma.cc/48D8-VAE9] (“Discussions about the sharing economy lack
clear definitions. This bogs public debate down in platitudes and slogans, voiced by both
proponents . . . and opponents . . . .”); Brad Tuttle, Can We Stop Pretending the Sharing Economy Is
All About Sharing?, TIME (June 30, 2014), http://time.com/money/2933937/sharing-economyairbnb-uber-monkeyparking/ [https://perma.cc/QC8A-C5CC].
6. See, e.g., Annie Lowery, How One Woman Could Destroy Uber’s Business Model – And Take
the Entire “On-Demand” Economy Down with It, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 30, 2015, 7:30 AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/04/meet-the-lawyer-fighting-ubers-business-model.html
[https://perma.cc/S9J6-DS38] (discussing a lawsuit against Uber for violating labor standards);
O’Connor v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2013 WL 6354534, at *5–7 (N.D. Cal.).
7. Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
8. Lisa Fleisher, Taxi Drivers Plan Big Protest Against Uber Technologies Across Europe, WALL
ST. J. (June 10, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/taxi-drivers-plan-big-protests-againstuber-technologies-across-europe-1402432899 [https://perma.cc/7YGC-B2S5]; Dave Evans,
Coalition Gathers at City Hall to Protest Airbnb, ABC 7 NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://7online.com/business/coalition-gathers-at-city-hall-steps-to-protest-airbnb/306200/
[https://perma.cc/YTL9-3YJB].
9. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Washington Scrutinizes the Sharing Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2015,
6:06 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/washington-scrutinizes-the-sharing-economy/
[https://perma.cc/3R7G-YKD8].
10. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and
the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (2015) (“[E]xisting regulatory structures often
discourage such innovations, reducing their popularity and slowing their development.”).
11. The expansion of the P2P economy—in terms of number of users, economic growth, areas of
trade, effect on established industries, and geography—is immense. It has now grown to include the
transportation, hospitality, personal services, financing, errands, and consumer goods industries, to
name just a few. Jeremiah Owyang, Infographic: A Day in the Life of the Collaborative Economy,
WEB STRATEGIST (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/09/29/a-day-in-thelife-of/ [https://perma.cc/V7CZ-K3AT].
12. See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 147, 156 (2016); Darcy Allen & Chris Berg, The Sharing Economy: How Over-Regulation
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company, is only seven years old and already valued at $41 billion—
while disrupting the traditional model of taxi cabs by eschewing
corporate ownership of cars or medallions (alienable licenses, worth tens
of thousands of dollars, to operate taxis in regulated cities). 13 The
company now operates in fifty-seven countries on five continents. 14
Other companies have joined the market as well (e.g., Lyft and Hitch), a
trend recently dubbed “Uberification” or “Uberization.” 15 In the
hospitality arena, Airbnb, a company that facilities short-term rentals, is
valued at $13 billion 16 and arranged 155 million stays last year—22%
more than Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. 17 Similar companies in
various sectors of industry also flourish, and many businesses now
structure their services so that they will fall under the complimentary
halo of the “sharing” economy. 18
Lawmakers’ responses to the rapid growth of the model have been
slow, confused, and scattered. 19 Their approaches vary from

Could Destroy an Economic Revolution, 25 INST. PUB. AFF. (2014), https://ipa.org.au/portal/
uploads/Sharing_Economy_December_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D2S-TTZV].
13. Douglas MacMillan, Sam Schechner & Lisa Fleisher, Uber Snags $41 Billion Valuation,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-new-funding-values-it-at-over-41billion-1417715938 [https://perma.cc/P6SP-SHA8].
14. Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities [https://perma.cc/2TY7-5XGB] (last visited July 2,
2015).
15. Scheiber, supra note 2 (“In retrospect, the Uberization of the economy began innocently
enough back in the late 1970s.”); Maria Gonzalez, The Uberification of Society, MOBILE WORLD
CAP. (July 11, 2014), http://mobileworldcapital.com/503/ [https://perma.cc/L9E2-UPCJ].
16. Tim Bradshaw, Airbnb Valued at $13B Ahead of Staff Stock Sale, CNBC (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102117120 [https://perma.cc/L9E2-UPCJ].
17. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE SHARING ECONOMY,
(2015),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-media/publications/consumer-intelli
gence-series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN9X-RPZR] [hereinafter
CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES].
18. Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE, at 1 (Oct. 2014)
(“Many organizations have been eager to position themselves under the ‘big tent’ of the sharing
economy because of the positive symbolic meaning of sharing, the magnetism of innovative digital
technologies, and the rapidly growing volume of sharing activity.”).
19. The P2P economy presents a regulatory dilemma because providers are often not
sophisticated, traditional players who know how to engage with licensing and regulation—and
sometimes deal with relatively small amounts of money. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring,
Can Sharing Be Taxed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 990, 996 (2016). In addition, the P2P economy
encompasses a range of activities that different administrative agencies have traditionally regulated.
Miller, supra note 12, at 175. Finally, lawmakers face opposing political pressures—from
incumbent providers, on the one hand, who are often politically organized, and from users of the
services and capital investors in the P2P companies, on the other. Id.
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nonintervention, to creating new regulatory regimes, 20 to sporadically
cracking down on some of these services, 21 to complete bans. 22
Scholarly responses to the phenomenon have been similarly deficient.
The burgeoning scholarly literature—coming from such different fields
as law, business, sociology, and economics—has insisted on a sectorial
approach to regulation. That is, scholars have asserted that the best way
to evaluate the model and to craft appropriate policy is in silos:
examining each market, or each regulatory aspect, alone. 23 For example,
because the short-term rentals market is markedly different from the
transportation market, these scholars contend that the only way to craft
pertinent regulation is through separate inspection of the two markets
and recommendations for regulations relevant to each market
respectively. 24 Proposals such as keeping the tax aspect separate from
employment issues and zoning laws exemplify the common prerogative
of addressing each legal aspect of the P2P economy individually. 25 Thus,
a comprehensive theory—rather than fragmented policymaking
proposals—is what is missing from the growing literature.
Further, most scholars mistakenly embrace the narrative of sharing
(that is, the idea that altruistic or communal interests define the market),
or they overstate the innovation of the P2P economy as transforming

20. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR. ADMIN. R. § 3.30.040(D)(5) (2015) (creating a unique regulatory
regime for regulation of short-term rentals); Miller, supra note 12, at 186–91 (providing a detailed
explanation of the regulations in San Francisco and Portland); Andrew Bender, New Regulations to
Wipe Out 80% of Airbnb Rentals in California’s Santa Monica, FORBES (June 15, 2015, 3:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2015/06/15/new-regulations-to-wipe-out-80-of-airbnbrentals-in-californias-santa-monica/ [https://perma.cc/4DMM-GWVR] (describing the new
regulations in Santa Monica, California).
21. Sharing Economy 2.0: Can Innovation and Regulation Work Together?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 5, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-nextphase-for-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/JS8N-ND3B] (describing an incident in which the
Philadelphia Parking Authority conducted a sting operation on UberX cars in Philadelphia).
22. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-491.1, http://cityofno.granicus.com/
MetaViewer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1819&meta_id=243027
[https://perma.cc/24S8-8SFK]
(declaring short-terms rentals illegal).
23. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12, at 151 (arguing that “a regulatory response to the sharing
economy requires recognition that the types of transactions occurring differ substantially in how
they affect the real world and thus require a differentiated regulatory response”); Brishen Rogers,
The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015) (focusing solely on Uber’s effect
on society); Oei & Ring, supra note 19 (focusing solely on tax aspects); Barry & Caron, supra note
10 (focusing solely on tax aspects of transportation sector).
24. Miller, supra note 12, at 151.
25. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 19, at 6–8; Michael N. Widener, Shared Spatial Regulating
in Sharing-Economy Districts, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 111, 114 (2015).
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models of consumption—from owning to borrowing. 26 Some literature
has failed to look critically at what is really at stake in terms of
economic activity and innovation. Finally, some commentators advocate
dichotomist approaches to regulations, either calling for self-regulation
or imposing traditional regulation on the P2P economy. 27
Meanwhile, in the world of legal theory—a terrain that seems far
away from the debate about the P2P economy—a concept that I label
“autonomy-based pluralism” (I use the term “pluralistic theory”
interchangeably) has gained immense traction. 28 Briefly, legal pluralistic
theory posits that the state ought to facilitate different options, or diverse
social and legal spheres, across a spectrum of activities in order to allow
people to self-govern (to exercise their autonomy). 29
On closer scrutiny, it is apparent that there are some striking
resemblances between arguments in favor of the P2P economy and the
defense of pluralistic theory. That is, supporters of the P2P economy and
advocates of pluralistic theory adopt remarkably similar rhetoric and
reasoning. For instance, one of Uber’s main slogans is “Choice is a
beautiful thing”; 30 likewise, P2P proponents, as their core justification,
often rely on the heterogeneity of goods and increased choice that the
P2P economy affords—to providers and consumers alike. 31
26. See, e.g., Barry & Caron, supra note 10, at 70–71 (embracing the principles of “sharing”);
Allen & Berg, supra note 12, at 6 (“The sharing economy is about sharing the knowledge of goods
and services to better exchange them.”); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 416 (2015) (“The sharing
economy presupposes two elements: the existence of physical ‘shareable goods that systematically
have excess capacity,’ and a sharing attitude or motivation.”); Widener, supra note 25, at 111
(embracing the sharing definition); Oei & Ring, supra note 19, at 8–10 (providing a more nuanced
description of the activity but still embracing the term “sharing”). But see Rogers, supra note 23, at
87 (“Uber describes this as ‘ride-sharing,’ but that is a misnomer—nothing is shared.”).
27. See infra section II.A. (describing approaches to regulations).
28. See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
915, 915 (2012); Bertram Lomfeld, Contract as Deliberation, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8
(2013) (“A newer camp of scholars offers genuine pluralistic multi-value theories of contract law.”);
Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and Balancing, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 535, 538 (2013) (arguing that “all normative legal theories should be pluralist”).
29. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1435
(2012) [hereinafter Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism]. For definitions and discussion of
pluralistic approach, see infra section II.B.
30. James C. Courtovich, What Uber and School Choice Have in Common, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
28, 2014, 6:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/james-courtovich-what-uber-and-school-choicehave-in-common-1411945071 [https://perma.cc/PH5G-7HYT] (“Satisfied passengers, drivers and
investors are singing Uber’s tagline: Choice is a Beautiful Thing.”).
31. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656 [https://
perma.cc/4PMG-EBWB] (enumerating among the benefits of the P2P economy “[g]reater product
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Analogously, pluralistic theory applauds the existence of diverse human
values and valuations and the right to choose among them; it celebrates
the state’s role as facilitator of a multiplicity of options. 32 Indeed,
defeating the argument that legal scholarship has little relevancy to
practical dilemmas (at least on the surface), one of the most influential
current legal theories and the most important regulatory dilemma of the
time actually align.
I therefore suggest a contextual perspective that guides the sectorial
approach to regulation of the P2P economy, building on insights from
pluralistic theory. 33 Pluralistic theory offers a comprehensive theoretical
framework for the understanding and assessment of the P2P model’s
social benefits and consequences. The theory generates diffusible
principles that scholars and lawmakers can turn to later in the context of
sectorial analyses.
Looking at P2P-generated activity through the lens of pluralistic
theory reveals that the model does not present activities or legal
dilemmas unfamiliar to the law. Rather, the virtue of the P2P economy is
that it reflects the ideal of pluralistic principles by accommodating and
vindicating different types of human experiences, thus expanding
meaningful choice for consumers and providers alike.
Essentially, P2P technology enables economic activity that is based
on what I call “access to excess,” which means temporary access based
on excess capacity. These are exchanges that employ infrastructures—in
this case, time, skills, space, or goods—that are not being fully exploited
to create value and do not require new infrastructures to leverage or
sell. 34 In such transactions the provider offers the consumer temporary
and service variety.”); Workers on Tap, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 3, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21637393-rise-demand-economy-poses-difficultquestions-workers-companies-and [https://perma.cc/YZ4M-2KTH] (“Techno-optimists dismiss all
this as teething trouble: the on-demand economy gives consumers greater choice, they argue, while
letting people work whenever they want.”); Maynard Webb, The Sharing Economy Offers More
Choices for Consumers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
accelerators/2014/04/15/maynard-webb-the-sharing-economy-offers-more-choices-for-consumers/
[https://perma.cc/S7AC-9PEL] (“What these new services are adding are not just rides or rooms.
They are also offering choice. Choice is always a great thing.”).
32. Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism, supra note 29, at 1423 (“[T]he ideal of personal
autonomy [is] that people should, to some degree, be the authors of their own lives, choosing among
worthwhile life plans and being able to pursue one’s choice.”).
33. I do not argue that the sectorial approach to regulation is meritless. Clearly there are fieldspecific concerns and considerations that lawmakers should address in crafting regulations. Rather, I
suggest that we must suppress the particularities and differences of the contexts in which the P2P
economy is popping up—in order to find what unites the different modes of the P2P economy under
one umbrella (at some level of abstraction).
34. See, e.g., Stemler, supra note 31, at 22–23.
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access to her underutilized goods, space, or skills. 35 Examples include
car owners’ giving someone the benefit of their private cars while the
former are not using them, renters’ loaning someone the use of their
apartments while they are away, or skilled laborers’ using their trade
competence while outside of their primary employment. As I explain in
Part I, the intermediaries (the platforms) use technological advances to
recognize and capitalize upon efficiencies that were more expensive and
difficult to realize before. The excess capacity is thus taken advantage of
through the rise of technological forms that allow it to be efficiently
apportioned. Access-to-excess-based activity reduces barriers to entry
into transactions, allows nonexpert participants to exchange services and
goods and to sell smaller segments of their labor, and therefore enables
another layer of market choice.
But, as I explain in Part I, not all P2P economic activity is based on
access to excess capacity, and lack of regulation allows the P2P
economy to encompass conventional activity under the façade of access.
By “conventional activity,” I mean the same types of services that
incumbents provide—work that is not temporary and is not grounded in
use of excess capacity—and where the only major change is the
intermediary. For example, taxi drivers who switched to Uber and work
full time with a car that they use predominantly for that kind of work; in
such scenario, Uber serves the role of traditional dispatcher—no
different from traditional cabs that use an app. 36
This Article’s contribution is in arguing that autonomy-based
pluralism commends creation of a separate regulatory regime that
distinguishes between standard economic activity and activity that relies
on access to excess. That is, access-to-excess capacity should be
regulated differently from conventional activities, out of recognition of
the important role of individual choice that drives this model. At the
same time, a separate category would prevent conventional firms from
masquerading as providing access-to-excess-based activity in order to
evade regulation—while subverting the policy goals of regulation and
35. See infra text accompanying notes 54–69 (defining the different activities that fall under the
P2P economy).
36. For instance, in Long Beach, California, the traditionally regulated cabs use an app that is
similar to that of Uber. See Laura J. Nelson, Long Beach Allows Taxis to Lower Fares as They
Compete with Uber, Lyft, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/lame-long-beach-uber-20150514-story.html [https://perma.cc/B2CV-ND97] (reporting that, to assist
taxi drivers in the competition with P2P transportation, Long Beach relaxed some of its regulations,
and that taxi drivers use a “new Uber-like app (Ride Yellow)”). Thus, in a situation where the Uber
driver is a full-time worker, the only major difference between Uber and the traditional cab industry
is the level of government regulation. Such a transaction is what I mean by “access in disguise.”
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distorting the marketplace. The result is that different sets of rules should
apply to access-to-excess-based activity, while conventional activity
should be subject to the more rigorous requirements of traditional
industry. To clarify, much of the current scholarship is occupied with the
question of whether the existing legal framework should apply to the
P2P economy. I do not contend that the current legal regime is
inapplicable; rather, I argue that, as a normative matter, the state should
create new sets of laws that fit the economic activity of the access-toexcess economy.
In fact, pluralistic principles offer a theoretical justification for
regulating the P2P economy—even of the separate category of accessto-excess-based transactions. This is because pluralistic theory does not
endorse free-market and hands-off policies; rather, it requires state
intervention to preserve existing choices (the traditional services),
embed and balance diverse values (not only autonomy), protect
individuals from discrimination, shelter them from employment
exploitation, and protect consumers and other businesses from strategic
and opportunistic behaviors. 37
Importantly, pluralistic principles offer the normative foundation for
inventive regulation of the new category—neither traditional nor free
market. Such regulation would restrain some of the P2P economy’s
harms without impeding innovation. The theory essentially lays out the
foundation of the state’s political-legal obligation to provide a new
framework for regulating the P2P economy. For example, the state
should create at least one intermediate status of employment between a
1099-MISC worker and a W2 worker—distinctions I explain in depth
later on. 38
Finally, after evaluating the P2P economy through the lens of
pluralism, this Article reverses that lens and considers what the P2P
economy has to offer to pluralistic theory. The P2P economy can be
viewed as a real-life laboratory that—although imperfectly—reflects the
basic principles of pluralistic theory. Therefore, it offers a novel and
critical opportunity to examine the effectiveness and weaknesses of
pluralistic theory. The P2P economy, especially, demonstrates how the
plasticity of pluralistic theory can operate as a comfortable breeding
ground for the adoption of free-market policies under the guise of
choice.
37. See infra section II.C (discussing the differences between pluralistic principles and a freemarket approach).
38. See infra section II.C (discussing the regulatory regime of access-to-excess-based activity and
the creation of a new employment status).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I defines the
P2P economy, lays out the debate about its regulation, and critically
frames its innovation. Part II canvasses the development of pluralistic
theory and explores the lessons that can derive from it vis-à-vis the P2P
economy. Part III uses the P2P economy as a real-life laboratory to shed
light on the risks and shortcomings of pluralistic theory. A brief
conclusion follows.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE P2P ECONOMY

This Part delves into the definition of and debate about the P2P
economy. Section A defines and characterizes the P2P economy—
particularly the types of markets that this Article addresses. Section B
lays out the debate about the model’s benefits and harms. Using a
critical lens, section C explores the innovation of the P2P economy and
its distributional effect.
A.

Defining the P2P Economy: On Sharing, Access, and Excess

In order to craft suitable regulation for the P2P economy we must first
define the economic model at stake. Definition is especially important in
this context because the model covers a variety of economic activities,
transcends various industries (e.g., hospitality, transportation, and
services), and, most importantly, receives varying characterizations from
scholars and commentators. 39 Indeed, much of the controversy about the
P2P economy begins with its definition, its portrayal, and the evaluation
of the type of economic activities it entails. 40
It is useful to begin by eliminating what this economic model does not
involve, since existing definitions often embed some value judgment. 41
Part of the squabble stems from the frequent use of the words “sharing”
39. See infra notes 93–112 (discussing divergent views of the sharing economy’s benefits and
flaws).
40. See, e.g., Ruiz, supra note 9 (discussing different reactions to the definition of the P2P
economy); Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 509–10 (2016) (“The debate
over the sharing economy thus remains frustrating and controversial in large part because we lack a
doctrinally cohesive and normatively satisfying way of talking about the underlying activities
occurring within the sharing economy.”).
41. Professors Giana M. Eckhardt and Fleura Bardhi provide one notable exception. They argue
that access—not sharing—defines the model. Accordingly:
When ‘sharing’ is market-mediated—when a company is an intermediary between consumers
who don’t know each other—it is no longer sharing at all. Rather, consumers are paying to
access someone else’s goods or services for a particular period of time. It is an economic
exchange, and consumers are after utilitarian, rather than social, value.
See Eckhardt & Bardhi, supra note 3.
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and “collaboration”—terms that already paint the activity as altruistic,
communal, and environment-friendly. 42 P2P firms often use these terms
in their marketing, with slogans like “helping out your neighbors,” 43 in
order to portray the activity as consumer-friendly. And many scholars
adopt the implied or explicit value of sharing as a main aspect of the
model. 44 Indeed, one commentator has already coined the term
“sharewashing,” meaning using sharing rhetoric to disguise conventional
economic activities—particularly when the term is used by companies
that treat their competitors and providers (employees) unfairly. 45
In fact, “sharing” and kindred designations are misnomers. Even if
there are some altruistic or communal motives among those in the P2P
economy, the heart of the industry is financial gain and not altruistic
exchanges. 46 All sides to the transaction are motivated, to some extent,
by individualism and pursuit of self-interest. Facilitators gain from the
increasing number of dealings, as they take a slice of each transaction.47
Consumers pay for the services and goods, and providers enjoy an
additional, or main, source of income. All types of transactions are
monetized. In contractual terms, we can say that all these exchanges are
supported by consideration (as I explain below, I am limiting my
discussion to for-profit platforms and am not including those that
advance more altruistic endeavors). 48 As Donald Kochan put it,
the sharing economy can be tagged as what’s mine is still mine
but you may use it, access it, and maybe pretend that it is yours
for a limited time and under limited conditions—for a fee—but

42. Maia Szalazvit, Is Human Nature Fundamentally Selfish or Altruistic?, TIME (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://healthland.time.com/2012/10/08/is-human-nature-fundamentally-selfish-or-altruistic/
[https://perma.cc/VPG5-7DS7].
43. Tom Slee, Sharing and Caring, JACOBIN MAG. (Jan. 24, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.
com/2014/01/sharing-and-caring/ [https://perma.cc/XK8G-W2XS] (“Running errands is another
major sector of the sharing economy, building on the sharing idea of ‘helping out your
neighbors.’”).
44. See supra note 26.
45. Anthony Kalamar, Sharewashing Is the New Greenwashing, OPED NEWS (May 13, 2013),
http://www.opednews.com/articles/Sharewashing-is-the-New-Gr-by-Anthony-Kalamar-130513834.html [https://perma.cc/8SF9-MXH2].
46. Cf. Rogers, supra note 23, at 87 (“Uber describes this as ‘ride-sharing,’ but that is a
misnomer—nothing is shared.”). See also Caleb Holloway, Keeping Freedom in Freelance: It’s
Time for Gig Firms and Gig Workers to Update Their Relationship Status, 16 WAKE FOREST J.
BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 299, 303 (2016) (“[G]ig work is not about ‘sharing.’”).
47. See Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1071–72
(2015) (“[T]ransaction fees can range from 3 to 20%.”).
48. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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while you are doing those things it is still mine and when you
are done doing those things it will still be mine. 49
To avoid the misnomers, I adopt a definition based on two elements:
“temporary access” and “excess capacity” (I refer to this approach as
“access to excess”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “access” as: “A
right, opportunity, or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from . . . .” 50
Temporary access, standing alone, is not unique to the P2P economy. A
passenger gets temporary access to a taxi while using it, and a guest gets
temporary access to a hotel room. To differentiate between these
traditional marketplace activities and the P2P economy, I combine
access with excess capacity. “Excess capacity,” according to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
“refers to a situation where a firm is producing at a lower scale of output
than it has been designed for.” 51 The context of excess capacity “exists
when marginal cost is less than average cost and it is still possible to
decrease average (unit) cost by producing more goods and services.”52
Excess capacity allows a business to use existing production tools and
infrastructure to produce more goods and services without the need to
invest more in infrastructure.
Taken together, I refer to transactions that consist of temporary access
to “underutilized goods” or “dead capital.” 53 Access to excess, in these
contexts, describes transactions in which one exchanges her goods,
skills, or space when she is not using them/it—and in which the other
person to the transaction (the purchaser) receives temporary access to the
goods, the skills, or the space. 54 To be sure, providers using excess
capacity often add marginal costs when supplying goods or services in
these markets. For instance, the Lyft driver needs to purchase gasoline
49. Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming May
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820456 (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
50. Access, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
51. Excess Capacity, OECD: GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND
COMPETITION LAW 42 (1993), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3209 [https://perma.
cc/FB4T-35KS].
52. Id.
53. Kochan, supra note 49, at 23 (“This idea of maximizing the use of unused or under-utilized
assets is a critical, unifying characteristic in what defines sharing.”).
54. A report written by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, a libertarian-oriented
think tank, defines “sharing economy” as “any marketplace that brings together distributed networks
of individuals to share or exchange otherwise underutilized assets.” Koopman, infra note 93. See
also Oei & Ring, supra note 19, at 2 (“While there is no universal definition of the term ‘sharing
economy,’ commentators have described it as a model of production, consumption and distribution
of goods and services whereby people ‘share’ their assets or other resources on an excess capacity
basis via a peer-to-peer arrangement.”) (citation omitted).
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and pay for extra maintenance when working as a driver—just as a
traditional taxi driver does. Yet, the Lyft driver maximizes the use of her
private car—which otherwise would be parked at home and go unused.
Two important caveats follow. One, scholars and commentators often
use the term “access economy” in reference to the P2P economy to
describe an economic model that offers easier access to goods, spaces,
and skills. 55 The result, the argument goes, is that access replaces
ownership. In the words of Sofia Ranchordás, “[Y]ou are now what you
can access, and not what you have.” 56 There are some misconceptions in
this framing, too, and I take these on in section I.C.
Second, not all the activities that scholars refer to as part of the P2P
economy fall under the definition of access to excess, as I conceive it.
Although the idea that the P2P market is based on access to otherwise
underutilized goods or skills describes a fairly substantial portion of this
economic activity, it cannot account for other sizeable aspects of P2P
economic activity. This is because the market frequently does not
revolve around “otherwise underutilized assets.” Rather, providers in the
P2P economy are intermittently professional players with assets
designed for the particular trade. For example, several hosts use Airbnb
to post properties designated for the particular purpose of short-term
rental, and thus are akin to a hotel operation. 57 Indeed, a new study
conducted by researchers at Pennsylvania State University (with funding
from the hotel industry) found that nearly 30% ($378 million) of
Airbnb’s revenue in twelve cities came from “full-time operators,” with
rentals available the entire year. 58 Similarly, while some platforms
facilitate short-term rental of noncommercial cars (such as Getaround), 59
55. See, e.g., Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 416 (“In this new model, access is ‘the new form of
ownership.’”).
56. Id. at 415–16.
57. For example, one study shows that significant numbers of renters in New York City have had
multiple listings. Slee, supra note 43. Indeed, in 2014, Airbnb announced that it removed more than
2,000 listings made by property managements. David Hantman, New York and the Airbnb
Community, THE AIRBNB PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Apr. 21, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/newyork-airbnb-community/ [https://perma.cc/37N5-ZTH2]. Moreover, an independent report recently
found that Airbnb manipulated its data by terminating full-time hosts just a few days before
releasing data about the number of full-time rentals using its services. Jonah Bromwich, Airbnb
Purged New York Listings to Create a Rosier Portrait, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/business/airbnb-purged-new-york-listings-to-create-a-rosierportrait-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/9G4W-QZD5]; see also infra text accompanying note
256 (describing the number of units in San Francisco that are offered for rent the entire year).
58. John W. O’Neill & Yuxia Ouyang, PENN. ST. U., From Air Mattresses to Unregulated
Business: An Analysis of the Other Side of Airbnb (2016), http://www.ahla.com/
uploadedFiles/_Common/pdf/PennState_AirBnbReport_.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4SD-FKUJ].
59. GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com [https://perma.cc/JR7F-L765].
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Uber assists some of its drivers in buying a car—rather than driving their
underutilized privately owned cars. 60 And, recently, Uber even started
leasing vehicles to its drivers. 61
Due to lack of regulation in some jurisdictions that distinguishes
between access-to-excess-based activities and conventional activities
that do not leverage existing excess capacity or are not temporary, the
law often does not distinguish between these activities; likewise, some
scholars and commentators treat the two types of transactions
interchangeably. 62 The bottom line is that increased utilization is not a
dispositive characteristic, nor always an accurate description, of the
market. 63
To distinguish between the different types of activities, this Article
delineates the P2P economy as an economic model where people
exchange goods, services, space, and money with each other via peer-topeer platforms. 64 Hence, I use the term “P2P economy” to describe the
market as it operates now (which includes a mix of conventional activity
and increased access-to-excess activity), while I refer to “access-toexcess-based activity” as a subset of activities within the P2P economy.
The typical transaction in the P2P economy includes three parties: the
provider (supplier), the user (consumer), and the facilitator (the website
platform). For example, in the hospitality market the provider is the
homeowner or renter (“host,” using Airbnb’s terminology), the user is
the traveler who pays to stay on the property (“guest,” using Airbnb’s
terminology), and the facilitator is Airbnb.

60. Emily Badger, Uber’s Program to Buy You a Car Sounds Like a Sweet Deal But It’s Actually
POST
(Nov.
6,
2014),
Really
Risky,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/06/ubers-program-to-help-you-buy-acar-sounds-like-a-sweet-deal-but-its-actually-really-risky/ [https://perma.cc/PB2Z-7CHB].
61. Carmel DeAmicis, Uber Starts Directly Leasing Cars in Program That Could Appeal to
Short-Term Drivers, RECODE (July 29, 2015, 8:38 PM), http://recode.net/2015/07/29/uber-offersrevised-car-leasing-program-that-could-be-more-appealing-for-drivers/
[https://perma.cc/VZ4ZR9HS].
62. To be clear, a single platform can be for both access-to-excess activities and conventional
activities. Airbnb can be used by students who sublet their apartment for a summer (access-toexcess capacity) or by those who avail themselves of the property as a unit for the entire year
(conventional activity).
63. See Stemler, supra note 31, at 7.
64. In this definition, I modify Miller’s designation, in which he uses “the term ‘sharing
economy’ inclusively to mean an economic model where people are creating and sharing goods,
services, space and money with each other.” I replaced the word “sharing” with the word
“exchanging” and added the peer-to-peer element, which is the basic component that allows these
arrangements. Miller, supra note 12, at 150.
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An additional important characteristic of what I refer to as the P2P
economy is the facilitator’s motive—i.e., social or financial incentive.
The P2P economy model includes for-profit and nonprofit platforms
alike; although a developing market for nonprofit exchanges has
emerged, 65 this Article focuses only on the for-profit market because this
is the one that raises the major regulatory and political dilemmas. 66 For
the same reason, I also exclude from discussion the platforms that are
for-profit on the facilitator’s side but cultivate nonprofit activities (for
example, Couchsurfing, a for-profit that facilitates free places to stay). 67
Another distinction to be aware of is between peer-to-peer exchanges
and business-to-peer exchanges. The latter include companies that
communicate directly with consumers (for example, Zipcar, which owns
vehicles and rents them to individuals by the hour or day). 68 This Article
looks only at peer-to-peer exchanges and not at business-to-peer, as the
former is the one that raises the notable regulatory debates.69

65. Schor, supra note 18, at 4; STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER ECONOMY” AND
RUNAWAY CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS 192 (2015) (describing businesses
that “truly” maintain sharing components).
66. See Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 436 (“It is important to distinguish between mainly socially
innovative activities, which are not primarily profit-oriented, and innovative activities that might
have a beneficial impact on a community, but at the same time have become someone’s main source
of income.”). This is not to say that nonprofits that facilitate noncommercial exchanges do not raise
any legal dilemma or should be completely left unregulated. Rather, many of the controversies
concerning the P2P economy revolve around paid services—e.g., questions related to employment
law and taxation—that are irrelevant to the nonprofit sector of the P2P economy. Yet, this sector
raises other relevant regulatory questions, such as those regarding discrimination and safety.
However, nonprofit activity triggers its own set of unique considerations and addressing them will
extend the scope of this Article more than required to answer the questions I am addressing, and
more than possible to accomplish in one article. Nevertheless, in a nutshell, a pluralistic approach
suggests that nonprofit work validates different types of experiences and values—and should be
regulated differently from conventional, for-profit activity. At the same time, pluralistic theory does
not advocate for nonintervention but, rather, for prevention and prosecution of fraud and other
possible harms.
67. As I explain in section II.C, the main reason that the state ought to regulate access-to-excess
activity is to prevent some likely market failures, such as by assuring nonexploitation of the workers
and basic safety of consumers, while enabling and easing the small-scale transactions that are the
subject of access-to-excess activities. Most of these problems are not applicable to a market that is
based on more genuine nonmarket transactions––which is why such transactions are not part of the
scope of the paper.
68. Schor, supra note 18, at 4.
69. As the main purpose of regulating the access-to-excess economy is to assure ease, efficacy,
and safety to small-scale players, when business is one of the parties, these special rules are
irrelevant (but other rules, pertaining to sophisticated merchants, are relevant).
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The main feature of P2P exchanges is the use of advanced technology
that provides some benefits that characterize the model. 70 First, the
technology cuts transaction costs—by reducing information and search
costs. 71 With traditional services, consumers had to invest more effort
and funds in locating services and goods (such as paying a babysitting
agency, paying for an ad to sublet one’s apartment, indirectly paying for
taxi dispatchers, etc.). With the P2P model, they can have all this
information in one website or app, typically with payment reduced to the
fee charged by the facilitator. Second, P2P companies aggregate verified
reviews by users and providers—making relevant information (including
price comparison) readily available and easy to evaluate.72 For example,
the service platform TaskRabbit offers a list of accessible service
providers ranked and reviewed by verified users; this is likewise the case
regarding the Uber driver or the apartment posted on Airbnb. 73 The
technology thus dispenses information necessary to appraise the service
or goods, easing a problem of informational asymmetry. Third, the
platforms adopt measures to safeguard users from possible fraud, which
helps them overcome some issues of trust. 74 Fourth, the technology is
typically user-friendly and available to everyone who has a smartphone
(sometimes a computer is sufficient) and a credit or debit card. 75
Beyond technology, a major feature of part—but not all—of the P2P
economy is that a good portion of P2P firms offer accessibility to
cheaper services because they operate outside existing laws and
regulations. 76 I discuss this issue in more detail in the next section.
In summary, this Article considers only for-profit, peer-to-peer
platforms that facilitate exchanges of durable assets and services on
demand. Narrowing the scope of activities to these types of undertakings
helps us to uncover what is at stake in the P2P economy, without falling
into too-broad generalizations. The next section delves into the debate
about the virtues and harms of the P2P economy.

70. Cf. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 433 (“[T]he creation of an online platform or a smartphone
application that connects users in a simple way constitutes the innovative element of the practice.”).
71. Miller, supra note 12, at 151.
72. See, e.g., Barry & Caron, supra note 10, at 70; Koopman, infra note 93.
73. Katz, supra note 47, at 1075.
74. See Stemler, supra note 31, at 4.
75. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text (discussing availability of smartphones and its
effect on the diffusion of the benefits of the P2P economy).
76. Miller, supra note 12, at 161–63.

04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]
B.

PLURALIZING THE “SHARING” ECONOMY

12/20/2016 12:44 PM

1413

The Debate About the P2P Economy

The use of P2P economy services is growing rapidly. In a survey that
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) conducted in 2014, 18% of U.S. adults
indicated that they have participated in the “sharing” economy as a
consumer. 77 Advertising agency Leo Burnett recently surveyed 4,000
adults in the United States. It found that, for 41% of those surveyed, the
P2P economy did not play any role in their lives; 48% said that it played
a minor role; and 12% stated that it played a major role. 78 A Morgan
Stanley survey found that 12% of travelers have used Airbnb at least
once in 2015; the number is expected to grow in 2016 to 18% for leisure
travelers and 16% for business travelers. 79
Consumers have expressed mixed feelings about, and various
motivations for, participating in the P2P economy. Consumers who view
the P2P economy favorably mention the lower price of services and
goods, along with convenience—for example, the ability to find a ride
easily. 80 Indeed, in the recent PwC survey, 86% of respondents who
were familiar with the P2P economy agreed that it makes life more
affordable, and 83% agreed it makes life more convenient and
efficient. 81 Likewise, 55% of Airbnb users in the Morgan Stanley survey
indicated that price was the most important factor for them. 82 Some
consumers also point to environmental benefits—such as those from
renting rather owning a car—although there are some questions as to
whether the P2P economy in fact contributes to a greener environment. 83
While the industry claims that social factors (e.g., the chance to interact

77. CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES, supra note 17.
78. Leo Burnett, The Sharing Economy: Where We Go from Here, SLIDESHARE (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.slideshare.net/LeoBurnettWorldwide/the-us-sharing-economy-leo-burnett-reportfinal?ref=http://humansbeing.leoburnett.com/ [https://perma.cc/8PD5-L5WW].
79. MORGAN STANLEY, INTERNET, LODGING, LEISURE AND HOTELS; GLOBAL INSIGHT: WHO
WILL AIRBNB HURT MORE—HOTELS OR OTAS? 1 (2015) [hereinafter INTERNET, LODGING,
LEISURE AND HOTELS].
80. CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES, supra note 17, at 9.
81. Id.
82. INTERNET, LODGING, LEISURE AND HOTELS, supra note 79, at 14.
83. Bryan Walsh, Today’s Smart Choice: Don’t Own. Share, TIME (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717_2059710,00.html
[https://perma.cc/25CM-S3PV]. The assumption that the P2P economy is more sustainable is
debatable since the result of the transaction may be increased use of the activity at stake. For
example, due to the lower prices of staying at a short-term rental or ordering an Uber driver, people
can use such services more than they have used traditional accommodations and services. This
creates more economic activity but can also produce higher carbon emissions. See, e.g., Schor,
supra note 18, at 7 (probing the arguments that the P2P economy has a positive ecological impact).
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with new people) are among people’s main reasons for participating in
the P2P economy, 84 controversy exists about whether consumers care
about the social aspect of it. 85 Some studies show that users are
indifferent to this aspect and are motivated primarily by utilitarian aims.
For example, research involving the users of Zipcar (a business-to-peer
platform) discovered that consumers do not feel commitment to the
company’s purpose or to the car itself; rather, they use it for its
convenience and lower price. 86 Additionally, other research indicates
that exchanges rarely result in social ties, and that “[s]haring economy
sites can also reproduce class, gender, and racial biases and
hierarchies.” 87
On the other hand, consumers who expressed some reservations
toward the P2P economy indicated concern about the risks of
exchanging goods with strangers, preferred ownership over borrowing,
and cited hygiene issues. 88 In addition, in a survey of consumers
conducted by Radius Global Market Research, 81% of respondents
agreed that sharing-economy companies do not adequately safeguard
private information. 89 Likewise, in the Morgan Stanley survey, 32%
noted that privacy concerns are the main reason they will not use

84. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 83 (“But the real benefit of collaborative consumption turns out
to be social. In an era when families are scattered and we may not know the people down the street,
sharing things—even with strangers we’ve just met online—allows us to make meaningful
connections.”).
85. One study confirms that those in the “sharing” economy actually participate in it for reasons
that are more ideological. However, the study examined participants who were registered to
Sharetribe—a company whose:
[S]tated mission is to help people connect with their community and to help eliminate
excessive waste through making it easier for everyone to use assets more effectively by sharing
them. Most of the “Sharetribes” are narrow local communities such as organizations or
neighborhoods where the benefits of CC [collaborative consumption] are emphasized in the
forms of trust and information access, and also in the decrease in transaction costs.
With this specific subject, no wonder that the results indicated commitment to altruistic motives.
See Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint & Antti Ukkoonen, The Sharing Economy: Why People
Participated in Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. TECH. 2047, 2053 (2016).
86. Zipcar is a business-to-peer model, which may explain some of the attitudes toward it. Yet,
the rhetoric of sharing and borrowing underlies the service’s branding. Fleura Bardi & Giana M.
Eckhardt, Access Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881 (2012).
87. Schor, supra note 18, at 8; see also Rogers, supra note 23, at 95–96 (discussing concerns that
passengers will give Uber drivers bad reviews based on their race and that drivers may refuse to
pick up some passengers when learning that they are from a racial minority group).
88. CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES, supra note 17.
89. Radius Market Global Research, Study: Consumers Undecided About the Sharing Economy,
PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 30, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/studyconsumers-undecided-about-the-sharing-economy-300151553.html [https://perma.cc/A3XF-AS4H].

04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

PLURALIZING THE “SHARING” ECONOMY

12/20/2016 12:44 PM

1415

Airbnb. 90 Finally, in a survey conducted by the National League of
Cities, 61% of the 245 city leaders who responded were most concerned
with public safety issues resulting from an increased use of P2P
services. 91 Potential Airbnb users expressed similar worries about
safety—27% mentioned that safety is the reason they will not use
Airbnb. 92
Commentators and scholars supporting the P2P economy cited the
model’s numerous benefits, some of them reflecting sentiments
expressed by consumers: use of otherwise-less-used resources; 93 creation
of flexible employment opportunities; 94 reduction in transaction costs; 95
freeing of industries from regulations deemed dated and inefficient; 96
boosting of innovation and increased economic and entrepreneurial
activity; 97 expansion of choice (especially of low-cost services); 98 and a
90. INTERNET, LODGING, LEISURE AND HOTELS, supra note 79.
91. NICOLE DUPUIS & BROOKS RAINWATER, SHIFTING PERCEPTIONS OF COLLABORATIVE
CONSUMPTION 2 (2015), http://www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/City-Solutions
-and-Applied-Research/Brief%20-%20Shifting%20Perceptions%20of%20Collaborative
%20Consumption2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7RP-KCYA].
92. INTERNET, LODGING, LEISURE AND HOTELS, supra note 79 (reporting on a survey finding that
27% of respondents did not use Airbnb due to safety concerns).
93. E.g., Rogers, supra note 23, at 90; Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer,
The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529 (2015).
94. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-thesharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html [https://perma.cc/3YQB-9ZKV]
(“‘Providers in the peer economy really value the independence and flexibility; for lots of people, it
has been transformational,’ says Shelby Clark, the founder of RelayRides, a car-sharing
marketplace . . . .”).
95. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 23, at 87 (“Uber’s key innovation lies in having reduced the
transaction costs that otherwise plague the sector and provided the justification for its extensive
regulation in the first place.”).
96. See, e.g., Koopman, supra note 93, at 534 (“While many regulations are initially justified
with the hope they will serve the public interest, the reality is many persist even when they no
longer (or perhaps never did) correct any identifiable market failure.”).
97. DuPuis & Rainwater, supra note 91; Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer
Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy 28 (NYU Stern School of Business Research Paper, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574337
[https://perma.cc/YH8F-SS3L]
(asserting that increasing tourist activity through hospitality P2P market can crate economic boost to
the neighborhood).
98. The Mercatus Center asserts five benefits of the P2P economy: (1) using underutilized goods
or “dead capital”; (2) increasing competition by creating accessible markets; (3) providing a pool of
traders who reduce transaction costs; (4) providing data on past performance of providers and users,
which offers informational benefits; and (5) circumventing existing regulations on account of
operating outside regulations that make incumbents inefficient. Koopman, supra note 93, at 531–32;
see also Allen & Berg, supra note 12, at 17–25 (contending that the P2P economy encourages more
use of underutilized resources and reduces costs, while warning that regulations will restrain it);
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possibly “disproportionately positive effect on lower-income
consumers.” 99 Thus, the Mercatus Center report concludes that the P2P
economy “can improve consumer welfare by offering new innovations,
more choices, more service differentiation, better prices, and higherquality services.” 100
Critics of the P2P economy argue that part of the model’s success
stems from ripping off profit by evading regulations. 101 The main claim
is that P2P firms operate outside the traditional regulatory regime and
thus do not abide by rules that incumbent providers must follow. These
evasions include facilitating transactions that dodge taxes, breaking
zoning laws, and escaping safety regulations. 102 For example, in the
hospitality market, most Airbnb users do not pay hotel taxes, which are
used to improve travel services and attract more tourists. 103 Additionally,
lessors often violate zoning rules, which can create problems concerning
safety, noise, and parking. 104 Further, renting a unit all or most of the
time creates a financial incentive to transform residential property into
short-term rentals. The result may be a reduction in available housing in
the rental market that then drives up housing prices. 105 Similarly, Uber
and Lyft do not follow the regulatory requirements that standard
transportation or taxi companies must follow. For instance, they do not
comply with the rigorous regulatory demands of the taxi industry
regarding price regulation, safety, and insurance. 106

David Streitfeld, Air BnB Listings Mostly Illegal, New York State Contends, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/business/airbnb-listings-mostly-illegal-statecontends.html [https://perma.cc/PHG2-PK5G] (“Admirers say these stars of the so-called sharing
economy are breaking up monopolies that have grown greedy and lazy.”).
99. Fraiberger & Sundararajan, supra note 97, at 28.
100. Koopman, supra note 93, at 532.
101. Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing Economy’ Hype: Airbnb and Uber Are Facilitating
Ripoffs, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014, 7:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation [https://perma.cc/83TJ-VH7M] (“[M]any boosters have
overlooked the reality that this new business model is largely based on evading regulations and
breaking the law.”).
102. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12, at 153 (“[M]ost sharing economy companies often explicitly
violate local government ordinances and state statutes.”); Rogers, supra note 23, at 92 (discussing
problems of Uber’s compliance with safety requirements).
103. Miller, supra note 12, at 173.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 175–79.
106. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 464.
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Finally, some fear that P2P practices undermine protection against
discrimination—both for consumers and workers. 107 For example, Uber
arguably violates the Americans with Disabilities Act by not providing
reasonable accommodations for disabled passengers. 108 And a recent
study by Harvard Business School researchers found that Airbnb users
(guests) with names that are distinctively African American were 16%
less likely to be accepted by hosts than users with identical profiles but
who had distinctively white names. 109
Opponents are also concerned about the harm to incumbent industries
and their employees resulting from unfair competition because P2P
firms are not bound by the same regulations as they are (or they are
bound by these regulations but do not conform to them). 110 Complying
with regulatory demands (such as insurance requirements and operating
taxis with medallions) and being responsible for employees’ taxes and
benefits increase the cost of incumbents’ services. 111 This competition
sometimes harms the smaller and more vulnerable incumbents. For
example—at least, according to one study—fancy hotels are less likely
to be disadvantaged by Airbnb than are smaller, lower-end hotels. 112
Moreover, others worry that P2P companies often exploit their own
providers; these providers are often categorized as “independent
contractors” (1099-MISC workers) and thus lack basic employee rights
107. The Disrupter Series: How the Sharing Economy Creates Jobs, Benefits Consumers, and
Raises Policy Questions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the U.S.
H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. (2015) (written testimony of Dean Baker, CoDirector, Center for Economic and Policy Research) [hereinafter The Disrupter Series testimony].
108. Complaint at *14–20, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc, No. 3:14-cv-4086
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2014) (arguing that “Uber has failed to ensure that blind riders with service
animals, including members of Plaintiff NFB of California, can access Uber’s taxi services”).
109. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-069),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/RacialDiscriminationAirbnb_9d996103-e4484396-8a2f-c4509a5e1a7f.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM8Z-EAZQ].
110. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12, at 181 (“[T]he illegality of the sharing economy [activities],
in fact, provides a shield for these companies from their more established counterparts that
participate in, and dominate, the legal markets like hoteliers.”); The Disrupter Series testimony,
supra note 107, at 12 (“[Sharing economy] technology can also be used as a mechanism to evade
taxes and necessary regulation. It will be important to modernize and redesign regulations to prevent
economy companies from going this route.”).
111. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12, at 161–63.
112. Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing Economy:
Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, 30 (Boston U. Sch. Mgmt. Research,
Working Paper No. 2013-16), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898
[https://perma.cc/LE97-PXKT] (“Our analyses pinpoint lower-end hotels, and hotels not catering to
business travelers, as those that are most vulnerable to increased competition from rentals enabled
by firms like Airbnb.”).
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and protections. 113 In 2015, both the Florida Department of Economic
Opportunity and the California Labor Commission ruled that Uber
drivers are “employees” rather than “independent contractors.” 114 The
following year, Uber agreed to settle a class-action lawsuit on the issue,
agreeing to pay up to $100 million to California and Massachusetts Uber
drivers in order to avoid having the federal courts determine whether
Uber drivers are entitled to employee status. 115 As such, the issue of
whether Uber and similar firms must recognize their drivers as
employees has yet to be judicially decided.
Providers for service companies—such as Handy, a home-cleaning
and handyman P2P platform—argue that they are not compensated for
extra workhours, are not paid for time in which consumers were late, and
are not reimbursed for cleaning supplies. 116 The web platforms—
designed to match the provider with the consumer—also present
disadvantages from the providers’ point of view. For instance,
TaskRabbit recently changed its platform to an on-demand system in
which a potential provider can easily lose a job to a second provider if
the former does not commit to the job within thirty minutes. 117 Providers
can also get fired at any time—as a result of complaints or bad reviews
by users—which can create pressure on the provider to respond to every
whim of the consumer. 118 More generally, many critics point out that the

113. Gillian B. White, In the Sharing Economy, No One’s an Employee, THE ATLANTIC (June 8,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/in-the-sharing-economy-no-ones-anemployee/395027/ [https://perma.cc/V84X-5AKY]; The Disrupter Series testimony, supra note 107
(“Most sharing economy firms treat the people who work for them as independent contractors. This
denies them the range of protections they would have as employees.”).
114. Davey Alba, In California, Uber Loses Another Round in Driver Debate, WIRED (Sept. 10,
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/california-uber-loses-another-round-driver-debate/ [https://
perma.cc/8TAM-7JLD]. See also Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is
Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-labor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employ
ees.html [https://perma.cc/ZCK5-J44X].
115. Tracey Lien, Uber Will Pay Up To $100 Million to Settle Suits with Drivers Seeking
Employment Status, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fitn-0422-uber-settlement-story.html [https://perma.cc/S29Q-ZZW6].
116. Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to Death, FAST
COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/the-gig-economywont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death [https://perma.cc/3LFF-DUEN].
117. Andrew Leonard, TaskRabbit Workers Receive a Useful Lesson in Capitalist Exploitation,
SALON (July 24, 2014, 7:05 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/24/taskrabbit_workers_receive
_a_useful_lesson_in_capitalist_exploitation/ [https://perma.cc/545U-UAR3].
118. See Rogers, supra note 23, at 97 (“To stay above a certain rating, drivers may need to be
friendly, and perhaps a bit servile.”).
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P2P economy intensifies the “freelance” society, in which employees
just move from gig to gig, without job security and stability. 119
Additionally, consumer safety is a major concern for critics of the
P2P economy. 120 For instance, one of the oft-cited arguments against the
P2P transportation companies is that they are not conducting sufficient
background checks on their drivers, especially compared with the
rigorous background checks that incumbents are mandated to follow
(traditional taxi drivers must go through significant, sometimes annual,
background checks). 121 Uber and Lyft advertise the fact that they do
background checks; however, critics argue that because they do not
employ “Live Scan,” and they fail to take fingerprints, their background
checks are “completely worthless.” 122 The background checks are
especially relevant as P2P passengers have reported—and received wide
publicity about—number of incidents in which P2P drivers have
attacked them. 123
Finally, questions have arisen about liability allocation in the P2P
market. Some commentators are critical of P2P firms for shifting the risk
of possible civil or criminal liability—resulting from injury to the
provider, the consumer, or the goods of either—from the companies to
the providers or users. 124 The main problem is that providers are
sometimes nonprofessional participants who do not have the incentive or
knowledge to anticipate future risks—and thus do not take sufficient

119. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 65, at 35.
120. Ridesharing Incidents: Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft,
WHOSDRIVINGYOU.ORG, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents [https://perma.cc/
Z85K-T3NP] (a website documenting reported incidents involving P2P transportation companies).
121. Aimee Picchi, The Rising Safety Issues That Could Throttle Uber, CBS NEWS (Dec. 11,
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-rising-safety-issues-that-could-throttle-uber/ [https://
perma.cc/USU2-JVNB].
122. HILL, supra note 65, at 74; Mike Isaac, Uber Agrees to Settle Class-Action Suit Over Safety
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/technology/uber-settlesclass-action-suit-over-safety-background-checks.html [https://perma.cc/E99U-D966] (discussing
that Uber has agreed to settle a lawsuit brought by customers arguing that Uber misrepresented the
quality of its safety practices and the fees it charged passengers).
123. See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Doe v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-04670
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) (alleging that Uber’s “negligence,” “fraud,” and “misleading statements”
led to the sexual assaults of the two women).
124. Catherine Rampell, The Dark Side of ‘Sharing Economy’ Jobs, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/catherine-rampell-the-dark-side-of-sharing-economyjobs/2015/01/26/4e05daec-a59f-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DAD9LUFT].
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measures to protect themselves from possible future liability. 125 To take
just one recent incident, an Airbnb guest died when he sat on the host’s
tree swing and the branch broke and fell on him. 126 The question that
arises in such situation is whether the host, the facilitator, or the guest is
liable. Clearly, many safety issues arise for users and providers of P2P
services and goods. 127 However, Airbnb does not owe the same legal
duty to their hosts and guests as hotels do, 128 and homeowner insurance
often does not cover commercial use (such as in case of renting the
property to a guest). Similarly, insurance policies for P2P drivers may
not apply when they operate for-profit vehicles 129 (although Uber
provides some commercial coverage to its drivers). 130
In conclusion, the debate on the P2P economy—its benefits and
drawbacks—is a heated and complicated one. It involves approaches
toward innovation, regulation, consumer protection, and fair
competition. Both sides have hefty arguments. The next subsection aims
to clarify one aspect of the debate by looking at what, in fact, is the
innovation of the P2P economy.
C.

Exploring the Innovation of the P2P Economy

Similar to the definition of the P2P economy, understanding the
innovation in the model is essential to evaluation and regulation of the
activity. And much like the discussion surrounding the definition—
explorations of the innovation that underlies the P2P economy are filled
with what I argue are misconceptions. Particularly, I challenge the
prevailing perception that the P2P economy changes models of
125. Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models WellAdapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 23, 36 (2015).
126. Ron Lieber, Death in Airbnb Rental Raises Liability Questions, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/your-money/death-in-airbnb-rental-raises-liabilityquestions.html [https://perma.cc/3KL5-Y44Y].
127. Katz, supra note 47, at 1100 (“In many cases, providers are just as vulnerable as users. For
example, TNC riders have reported incidents of assault and battery, sexual assault, and reckless
driving while using the platform.”).
128. Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 329, 332–34 (2015). Although jurisdictions vary in how they legally categorize
Airbnb guests for the purposes of determining hosts’ tort duties, the general principle is that Airbnb
hosts owe their guests lesser duties than would an innkeeper or hotel manager. Rather than viewing
Airbnb guests as hotel guests or gratuitous licensees, many jurisdictions apply a landlord-tenant
paradigm to Airbnb hosts and their guests.
129. Id. at 337.
130. Hannah A. Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing Economy: Should Regulators Impose Uber
Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 415 (2015).
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consumerism from ownership to borrowing. In addition, I scrutinize the
social innovation of the P2P economy in terms of the socioeconomic
distribution that the P2P economy supposedly promotes.
Innovation stands at the heart of the controversy surrounding
regulation of the P2P economy. Innovation is a hard concept to define. 131
It is sometimes, inaccurately, used interchangeably with “creativity” and
“invention.” 132 Invention involves the development of a novel idea. 133
Innovation, however, is broader: it is the application of a new idea to a
successful commercial operation and its effective dissemination. 134
Innovation has an additional social aspect: harnessing the
development of novel technologies to promote human progress or using
existing technologies to solve new problems. Social innovation connotes
“the design and implementation of creative ways of meeting social
needs.” 135 This aspect of innovation compels us to think beyond
innovation’s translation of new ideas into commercial products—by also
considering its diffusion of those ideas. This diffusion, and its effect on
the promotion of social progress, means that we must account for “the
context that surrounds a technology—such as personal and social values,
maintenance, use, and compatibility with existing laws.” 136 That is, we
should think through the way an innovation affects different social
cohorts. 137 With that in mind, I turn to examining the innovations
embedded in the P2P economy.
The innovation of the P2P economy is not grounded in the novelty of
its types of services and goods; that is, the types of services and goods
that are exchanged are not innovative. 138 Short-term rentals have been an
option for a long time, although the connection between lessor and
131. Cf. Doris Estelle Long, Crossing the Innovation Divide, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 507, 510 (2008)
(“Like every good watchword, ‘innovation’ has no precise meaning.”).
132. See Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2271 (2010).
133. Id.
134. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 427; Bernstein, supra note 132, at 2271.
135. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 428 (citation omitted).
136. Bernstein, supra note 132, at 2291.
137. We can think about social innovation as types of innovation distinguished from market (or
technological) innovation, when the former refers to innovation that enhances social welfare and
aims to create social value by addressing substantive human needs, and the latter focuses more on
consumers’ needs and market value. See Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 9
(2014) (distinguishing between social innovation and other types of innovation). Or, as I prefer, we
can think of social innovation as an inherent aspect of innovation—because innovation is not only
deployment and dissemination of the technology but also the progress and improvement it offers
(although the degree of market innovation varies among different innovations). See Ranchordás,
supra note 26, at 433–36.
138. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 456–58.
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lessee was made through traditional methods, such as ads in a university
magazine. Paid share rides and carpooling date back to the beginning of
the twentieth century, 139 and errand and concierge services predate the
invention of the internet. Genuine sharing practices, or collaborative
consumption, are also not new at all. 140
The P2P economy’s innovation lies in its process of connecting
consumers and providers—and in the social benefits that the transactions
confer. However, scholars’ accounts about the innovation of this process
are often inaccurate or overstated. Many scholars and commentators
discuss P2P innovation without defining precisely what is innovative. 141
Others define that economy’s innovation as its reduction of barriers to
entrance into and exit from professions, services, and goods; in short, its
innovation lies in exchanges that involve better access to a variety of
goods and services. Such descriptions typically follow the assertion that
P2P transactions allow consumers to “own less and have access to
more.” 142 A different way to describe the same innovation is that it
promotes “a shift away from ownership.” 143 But does the P2P economy
really enable such changes in the consumerist model—and is borrowing
really less consumerist than owning? The short answer is no.
Characterizing the P2P economy’s innovation as motivating or as
enabling a switch from ownership to borrowing is mistaken—because
the P2P market often enough deals with goods and services that are not
about ownership to begin with (e.g., miscellaneous services, short-term
rentals, or cars when commuting is not required). As an example, people
who look for short-term vacation rentals via Airbnb would not have
purchased a property instead (they would have stayed in a hotel or with a
friend). Indeed, a study by Morgan Stanley affirms that almost half of
139. Jeff Cozza, The History of Carpooling, from Jitneys to Ridesharing, SHAREABLE (Feb. 7,
2012), http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-history-of-carpooling-from-jitneys-to-ridesharing [https://
perma.cc/T4XE-Y2CC].
140. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 456–58.
141. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 19, at 4 (in an article on regulating the P2P economy, the
authors discuss the “appropriate relationship between regulation and innovation,” thus conflating
“innovation” with the sharing economy); Miller, supra note 12, at 193 (“[T]he need for this
discussion is clear because of the innovative and personal nature of the [short-term rental]
market.”).
142. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 474.
143. The Sharing Economy: A Shift Away from Ownership?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO,
http://www.npr.org/series/244583579/the-sharing-economy-a-shift-away-from-ownership [https://
perma.cc/5QGG-CDJD]; Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 462 (“users of sharing practices prefer
sharing to ownership for a number of reasons”); LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS IS SHARING (2010) (characterizing the “mesh” as the transition from the ownership model
to the access model).
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Airbnb’s demand comes at the expense of traditional hotels. 144 Others
use Airbnb to replace staying with friends or family (31%) or in vacation
units (20%). 145 Further, P2P transportation services do not serve as an
alternative to efficient public transportation, and only infrequently can
they serve as replacements for car ownership; 146 they mainly serve as an
alternative to taxis. Finally, hiring someone from TaskRabbit does not
replace having a full-time housekeeper for those who can afford it. This
is not to say that the model does not extend the scope of existing
markets. 147 It just does not—at least not significantly—encourage people
to prefer borrowing to ownership, because it deals with services and
goods that users frequently do not own in any case.
Furthermore, many consumers do not really face the option of buying
versus borrowing; they do not have the means to buy a home, 148 a car, a
vacation unit, or even a few days in a hotel. 149 It is plausible, then, to
assume that those who can afford to own (the affluent) will continue to
own, while the others are left with only the option to borrow. Thus, the
P2P economy is not transforming consumers’ preferences from owning
to borrowing but, in this sense, only entrenching existing economic and
social practices.
Theoretically, borrowing that replaces ownership can have an effect
on ownership from the producer side. That is, since the P2P economy
allows existing owners to monetize excess resources, a smaller number
of hotels or cars are needed to accommodate the same number of
consumers because previously “trapped” excess resources are entering

144. INTERNET, LODGING, LEISURE AND HOTELS, supra note 79, at 1.
145. Id.
146. A recent analysis by NerdWallet studied, across all 50 states, the costs of using Uber and
Lyft as compared to owning a car. It found that car ownership is cheaper than taking Uber or Lyft
for every trip. Especially in cities where a commute is required, P2P transportation services are not
a good or cheaper alternative to car ownership. John Kuo, Can I Avoid Car Insurance by Using Lyft
and Uber?, NERDWALLET (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/insurance/2014/10/14/
avoid-car-insurance-costs-lyft-uber/ [https://perma.cc/Q4R2-Q53X].
147. Miller, supra note 12, at 194.
148. In 2015, for example, the homeownership rate dropped to be the lowest quarterly rate since
early 1993. See THE JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE
OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015 19 (2015), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/jchs-sonhr-2015-ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/23SD-X6ER].
149. For instance, about 42% of Americans said they did not take a single vacation day in 2014.
Almost half of Americans with annual incomes of less than $25,000 did take days off. Rafat Ali,
Travel Habits of Americans: 42 Percent Didn’t Take Any Vacation Days in 2014, SKIFT (Jan. 5,
2015, 6:00 AM), http://skift.com/2015/01/05/travel-habits-of-americans-41-percent-didnt-take-anyvacation-days-in-2014/# [https://perma.cc/YPT5-7BXN].
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the market. 150 However, this assumption is not without its problems, too.
First, we have indications that the P2P economy encourages a greater
level of consumption—that is, it increases the number of transactions. 151
Therefore, if the P2P economy increases consumption, it does change
consumerism’s model by switching the ownership from hotel or cab
owners to less institutionalized players. But it does not change the level
of ownership required. Second, as mentioned before, significant
numbers of providers operate businesses rather than capitalize on their
existing capacity.
If the P2P economy does not transform consumers’ model from
owning to borrowing—what is its social innovation? In terms of such
innovation, the distributional effect of the P2P is quite difficult to
evaluate. On the one hand, by making some services more widely
available at reduced prices, the P2P economy arguably promotes
increased use of these services by lower-income consumers. Indeed, a
study (financed by Uber) found that Uber provides more accessible ride
services than do traditional taxis (in terms of time of arrival) to lowincome neighborhoods in Los Angeles. 152
On the other hand, P2P services are not available to everyone because
they require a credit or debit card, an internet-connected computer, and
sometimes a smartphone. Smartphone ownership, however, correlates
with income level and age. A 2015 Pew Center research study indicates

150. See Jamie Lane & R. Mark Woodworth, The Sharing Economy Checks In: An Analysis of
Airbnb in the United States, CBRE HOTELS’ AMERICAS RES. 1, 1 (2016),
http://cbrepkfcprod.blob.core.windows.net/downloads/store/12Samples/An_Analysis_of
_Airbnb_in_the_United_States.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX2X-QS73]. The researchers identified New
York as the city whose hotel industry is most affected by Airbnb, followed by San Francisco,
Miami, Oakland, and Oahu. Id. at 13 (“[I]ncreased competition resulting from new supply can hurt a
hotel’s ability to raise rates and can even cause management to lower their rates to stay
competitive . . . Airbnb may be an impediment to traditional hotel construction and may reduce
traditional hotel supply growth in many markets.”). Regarding implications for the taxi industry, see
Laura J. Nelson, Uber and Lyft Have Devastated L.A.’s Taxi Industry, City Records Show, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-uber-lyft-taxis-la20160413-story.html [https://perma.cc/R475-A7NE] (“The decline mirrors what’s happening across
the country, as taxis—regulated by local governments on everything from price to the color of their
cars—struggle to compete with cheaper, more nimble start-ups.”).
151. Steven Hill, Is the Sharing Economy Truly Green?, SIERRA CLUB (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2016-2-march-april/green-life/sharing-economy-truly-green
[https://perma.cc/8JZJ-465Y] (arguing that ride-sharing services increase consumption, negatively
affecting the environment and traffic congestion).
152. Rosanna Smart et al., Faster and Cheaper: How Ride-Sourcing Fills a Gap in Low-Income
Los Angeles Neighborhoods, BOTEC ANALYSIS CORP. 1, 4 (2015), http://botecanalysis.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/LATS-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ5P-PYCV].
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that only 27% of Americans 65 and older own a smartphone. 153 And
only 50% of adults with incomes under $30,000/year—and 72% of
adults who earn $50,000–$74,999—own a smartphone. Thus, due to the
smartphone interface through which many P2P economy services
operate, P2P services are less accessible to consumers with low incomes.
Indeed, “with few exceptions, most sharing firms do not do much
business in poor communities.” 154
Similarly, it is doubtful how much the short-term rental market of the
P2P economy is helpful to people with lower incomes, as hosts are often
the already-affluent and users are usually at the higher end of income
distribution. Airbnb recently released data to combat allegations that it
contributes to the lack of affordable housing because its hosts take
apartments off the long-term rental market to rent them to Airbnb guests.
Airbnb provided data on approximately 59,000 assets that its New York
City hosts offered for rent from November 2014 to November 2015.155
Accordingly, 16% of hosts offered their apartments for terms longer than
121 days a year, and 3% did so for more than 271 days. 156 However, this
small minority provides a disproportionate share of Airbnb’s revenue—
around 24% of its total whole-home revenue. 157 Moreover, Morgan
Stanley’s survey found that roughly two thirds of U.S. Airbnb users fall
into the $75,000-plus annual income bracket—i.e., its users are mainly
consumers with above-average incomes. 158 All this indicates that the
distribution of benefits from the P2P economy may not trickle down
from the middle class in the amounts that some proponents suggest.
Furthermore, as I discuss more extensively below, the P2P economy
may allow consumers to pay less, but employees pay the price in less
stable employment opportunities. 159
For these reasons, we should overstate neither the innovation of the
P2P economy nor its social aspect. The P2P economy does not change
consumption practices in a major way and, so far, is unevenly
153. Aaron Smith, Chapter One: A Portrait of Smartphone Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1,
2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/chapter-one-a-portrait-of-smartphone-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/S566-YK9P].
154. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future
of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 954 (2015).
155. Ben Popper, Airbnb’s Worst Problems Are Confirmed by Its Own Data, THE VERGE (Dec. 4,
2015),
http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/4/9849242/airbnb-data-new-york-affordable-housingillegal-hotels [http://perma.cc/QS6Z-7C2A].
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. INTERNET, LODGING, LEISURE AND HOTELS, supra note 79, at 18.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 209–12.
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distributed—with some costs to employees and likely also to minorities.
As a result, the P2P economy is more apt to entrench, rather than
revolutionize, existing consumeristic and employment practices.
In conclusion, seeing the model for what it really does allows us to
more effectively assess it and formulate a useful regulatory response.
The next part refines this understanding by looking at the insights
derived from pluralistic theory.
II.

WHAT PLURALISTIC THEORY TEACHES ABOUT THE P2P
ECONOMY

Crafting apt regulatory responses to the P2P economy is a challenge
to policymakers and a major subject of debate among commentators.
What these commentators—both for and against regulation—have
generally overlooked is that, in terms of public policy and justifications
for regulation, the P2P economy does not present a novel issue for the
U.S. legal tradition. 160 While the particular dilemma—regulating the P2P
economy—is novel, the issues it brings into discussion are not
groundbreaking. The opposite is true: the economic model of the P2P
economy is a paradigm realization of what a familiar and wellestablished legal theory and political model discuss and advance. I will
call this theory by the term currently most prevalent in legal
scholarship—pluralism—but, as explained below, this theoretical model
has older roots and different names, and the notion of pluralism has
various different valences and interpretations. 161 This theory helps
greatly to resolve the controversy surrounding the assessment and
regulation of the P2P economy.
Section A categorizes the approaches to regulation of the P2P
economy into three groups. Section B traces the evolution of pluralistic
theory and canvasses its main principles. Section C explores the way that
pluralistic theory informs the debate about regulating the P2P economy.
Section D discusses the way different municipalities regulate the P2P
economy and analyzes which models comply with pluralistic principles
and which do not.
160. But see Oei & Ring, supra note 19, at 994 (arguing that “the application of substantive and
doctrinal tax laws to sharing is generally (though not completely) clear and not particularly novel”).
161. Legal pluralistic theory is also a name that denotes a different and important legal concept
that this Article does not discuss. This version focuses on the existence of “multiple overlapping
normative communities,” including normative rules that are not state-based. See, e.g., Paul Schiff
Berman, From Legal Pluralism to Global Legal Pluralism, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY
SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 255 (Richard Nobles & David Schiff,
eds., 2014), [https://perma.cc/36MC-NFV7].
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Approaches to Regulation of the P2P Economy

The debate about structuring appropriate legal regulation follows
similar lines to the views on P2P activities. On one end of the spectrum,
promoters of the P2P economy strongly oppose imposing “traditional”
regulation—i.e., rules that currently apply to existing businesses—on the
P2P economy. 162 These promoters contend that such regulation will
impede innovation and will favor the incumbents. For instance, the
Mercatus Center report contends that “regulations often become
formidable barriers to new innovation, entry, and entrepreneurship.” 163
And a report by the Institute for Public Affairs warns that “[t]he real
threat to the sharing economy is government regulation driven by the
incumbent industries that are challenged.” 164
In lieu of traditional regulations, many commentators advocate
primarily self-regulation of the industry. 165 According to them,
traditional regulation is needless in this context because P2P companies
have sufficient incentive to self-regulate and, indeed, have created
several mechanisms to overcome problems of quality and asymmetrical
information that are relevant to incumbent industries. 166 Hence, Molly
Cohen and Arun Sundararajan note that, in traditional industry, one role
of regulation is to fix asymmetrical information—as when a passenger
does not know whether the driver or the host can be trusted, or when the
driver knows the route better than the passenger does and therefore can
extend the ride beyond what is needed. 167 According to Cohen and
Sundararajan, in the P2P economy the facilitators already provide
adequate information to overcome this asymmetry: the host and the
driver are rated by others, which solves the problem of trust. And the
platform provides driving directions that decrease the risk that the driver
will unnecessarily extend the route. In addition, because the facilitators
162. See, e.g., Posen, supra note 130, at 429 (“Governments should not make Uber comply with
already-existing regulations.”); Stemler, supra note 31, at 2 (“[E]xisting laws cannot effectively
regulate the sharing economy because the sharing economy is uniquely comprised of individuals
profiting from their personal excess capacity.”).
163. Allen & Berg, supra note 12, at 2.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, SelfRegulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 458 (2011); Arun Sundararajan, Why
the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulatethe-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/C7W2-Q8QZ].
166. Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation
and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 112–113 (2015).
167. Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 464.
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have an incentive to increase the number of exchanges, they implement
safety requirements without extending the existing regulatory rules.
Replying to the argument that traditional regulation is imposed unevenly
on incumbents, the Mercatus Center report recommends “deregulating
down”—relaxing regulatory demands for both incumbents and P2P
economy players—rather than “regulating up.” 168
Conversely, other commentators and incumbent industries advocate
for traditional or traditional-like regulation of P2P activities: imposing
existing regulatory demands on the P2P market. 169 Similarly, some
municipalities that have outlawed certain P2P activities, or banned them
almost entirely, proffered arguments against particular industries that
were to be regulated. 170 By the same token, the chairwoman of the
Federal Trade Commission, Edith Ramirez, criticized the idea of
creating a “two-track” regulatory regime. “Regulating established
businesses differently from newcomers would confer an unfair
advantage to whichever model had the least costly regulations.”171
A third camp has adopted an approach that is somewhere in the
middle of the spectrum. 172 This approach rejects traditional regulation as
outdated, stringent, and inappropriate for the new P2P economy because
it was designed to regulate professional-to-consumer activity rather than
peer-to-peer exchanges. 173 They view such traditional regulation as

168. Koopman, supra note 93, at 19.
169. See, e.g., Posen, supra note 130, at 420–43 (describing lawsuits against Uber); Ruiz, supra
note 9; Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the Internet’s
Hottest Businesses, SALON (Mar. 14, 2014, 4:43 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/
sharing_economy_shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_internets_hottest_businesses/
[https://
perma.cc/8258-339K].
170. Tim Logan, Santa Monica Comes Down Hard on Airbnb; Will Crackdown Spread?, L.A.
TIMES (May 13, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-santa-monicacouncil-oks-tough-rental-regs-20150512-story.html [https://perma.cc/UUQ5-5M3F] (reporting that
Santa Barbara passed a law that bars renting units for fewer than 30 days); Posen, supra note 130, at
423 (“Finally, some states and cities have challenged Uber’s operations by proposing regulations
that would prohibit Uber from operating there.”).
171. See, e.g., Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, Harmonizing Regulations for Sharing Economy
Businesses, BROOKINGS TECHTANK (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
techtank/posts/2015/11/04-harmonizing-sharing-economy-regulations
[https://perma.cc/5PUCLBFG].
172. See, e.g., Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 465; Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property
in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015) (“It advocates a complex set of legal rules
that focus on the unique attributes of an intermediate space, instead of banning the sharing
economy, regulating transactions such as commercial property, or otherwise ignoring the activity.”).
173. See, e.g., Stemler, supra note 31, at 33 (explaining that some “authorities [are] imposing
regulatory structures designed for non-sharing economy businesses. These structures are very often
ill-fitted for the specifics of the sharing economy . . . .”).
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likely to stifle innovation. At the same time, those scholars support
regulation—albeit a new model of regulation tailored to the new market
in a way that would ensure public safety and fair competition while still
aiding innovation. Thus, Sofia Ranchordás advocates some restrictions
on P2P transportation companies—such as mandating background
checks and sufficient insurance—but not the application of all
requirements imposed on traditional transportation companies. 174
Similarly, Stephen Miller argues that, in the hospitality arena, traditional
regulation is ill-suited to the P2P market. In Miller’s view, banning
short-term rentals altogether or allowing only minimal exceptions to
zoning laws will fail because enforcement of such regulations will face
serious challenges as many services are small-scale transactions and are
quite intimate. As such, it is unlikely that violators will be caught—and
users will take the risk of being caught. 175 Moreover, cracking down on
facilitators will likely result in the creation of new platforms. Finally,
regulations will be deemed too invasive. Therefore Miller, who is
worried about bad actors in the market, suggests “alternative approaches
that rely on markets, information, and perhaps even regulatory structures
that model the sharing economy more directly.” 176 Finally, when it
comes to labor regulations, the all-or-nothing approach also does not fit
the current reality.
Likewise, Alan Krueger, economics professor and former chairman of
the White House Council of Economic Advisers, explained that:
Our legal system is not up to this new development [Uber, Lyft,
etc.], so these workers very much fall in a gray area . . . [W]e
have this bipolar system where a worker is an employee with a
lot of benefits and protections, or an independent contractor who
has to negotiate his or her own social compact. 177
Pluralistic theory, I argue below, sides with the third position—the
intermediate approach—and supplies a needed and missing theoretical
basis in support of this standpoint, as well some guidance about how the
regulation should look. The next section explains the foundational

174.
175.
176.
177.

Ranchordás, supra note 26, at 470–71.
Miller, supra note 12, at 168.
Id.
Alan Krueger, Is the Sharing Economy the New Normal?, MILKEN INSTITUTE GLOBAL
CONFERENCE, MILKEN INSTITUTE (May 4, 2016), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/events/
conferences/global-conference/2016/panel-detail/6223 [https://perma.cc/U4WX-LH5C]. See also
Holloway, supra note 46, at 316 (“The choice between independent contractor and employee, under
current standards, is no longer sufficient to describe what is actually happening in the workforce.
There is a need for either newly refined definitions of the two, or a third category.”).
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claims of pluralistic theory, and section C makes an explicit connection
between the P2P economy and pluralistic theory.
B.

The Development of Legal Pluralistic Theory

What we now know as “legal pluralistic theory” (or “autonomy-based
pluralism”) began with the rise of legal incommensurability theory at the
beginning of the 1990s. 178 At that time, a group of eminent legal
scholars, borrowing from established philosophical and political
pluralistic theories, introduced the idea of incommensurability in law. 179
The main two arguments of incommensurability theory are, first,
because the world is composed of diverse and plural universal values,
human beings assign different values or valuations to different goods or
experiences. 180 For instance, some goods (e.g., money, objects) are for
“use,” while others have intrinsic value (e.g., friendships), and
individuals experience and value these things differently. 181 Second,
because these values or valuations are different, they cannot be ranked or
reduced to one “super-concept.” We cannot put them on a single metric
and measure which is more important without undermining the different
conceptions of the valuations. 182 For instance, an economist may asses
the value of meat for consumption in monetary terms, while a vegan
might find such assessment offensive since it ignores the rights of
animals. 183 Thus, we cannot evaluate the benefits or harms of meat
178. See Nick Smith, Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 503, 504 (1997).
179. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993);
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994); Richard
H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2142 (1990); Richard Warner,
Incommensurability as a Jurisprudential Puzzle, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (1992).
180. Sunstein, supra note 179, at 780.
181. Id. at 782–83. The term “value,” in this sense, can refer to abstract values (e.g., justice,
equality, liberty), but more typically addresses the bearers of the values—the institutions that
embed these values. That is, while scholarship uses the term “values,” what is actually compared are
concrete reasons for preferring one option or good over another. See Burton, supra note 28, at 551.
Rather than comparing values in the abstract, modern literature examines our reasons for choosing a
certain option. When discussing values, I follow the tradition of using the term “values” both when
discussing abstract values and when exploring the bearers of the values (i.e., the options that each
legal institution offers).
182. See MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 11 (1996) (arguing that “there is no
scale along which all values can be arrayed in order so that for any value or package of values we
can say definitively that it has more or less value than some other”); Sunstein, supra note 179, at
784.
183. Cf. Smith, supra note 178, at 514 (“Examples of incommensurability often occur in
environmental issues.”).
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consumption using a single metric (such as a monetary or a “well-being”
standard), at least not in a way that will do justice to both valuations.
The problem of incommensurability illuminates several insights; a
particularly relevant one 184 is that “we should approve of a large degree
of diversity in kinds of valuation.” 185 That is, because individuals value
things in different ways, the state should make space for different types
of valuations (within clear limitations—as when doing so will harm
someone). 186 In the words of Cass Sunstein, “[a]n understanding of
diverse kinds of valuation helps explain why liberal regimes generally
respect voluntary agreements. If people value things in different ways,
the state should allow them to sort things out as they choose.” 187
The ideas promulgated by legal incommensurability theorists have
recently been reincarnated, albeit leading to other realizations, under the
title of “pluralistic theory.” The basic principle of the reemerging
pluralistic theory is that the state ought to actively provide the conditions
for meaningful choices to exist so that people can exercise their
autonomy. The recent version of this argument is most strongly and
eloquently laid out by Hanoch Dagan, who relies on the work of the
influential legal philosopher Joseph Raz. 188
Raz suggests that personal autonomy is an essential feature of
flourishing life. 189 For Raz, human beings can live autonomous lives
only if they are given an adequate range of options. In terms of adequate
choices, it is variety that matters, not quantity. For instance, adequate
184. A second insight from the problem of incommensurability of values is that policymakers
should “disaggregate” different values when considering the effect of a particular policy. That is, in
evaluating the proper regulatory response, we cannot measure diverse valuations on one metric (as
with cost-benefit analyses) because doing so makes different valuations invisible. Sunstein, supra
note 179, at 855; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 65 (1995) (“At least in principle, it would be better to have a disaggregated system
for assessing the qualitatively different effects of regulatory impositions. Not all benefits are
fungible, nor are all costs.”). Therefore, when deliberating about appropriate regulations, a simple
cost-benefit analysis is inadequate, as many options offer more than monetary benefits, and the
various options cannot be measured against each other. While P2P proponents emphasize
innovation and lower-cost services, such measurements yield an unsatisfactory result because they
make other considerations invisible.
185. Sunstein, supra note 179, at 855.
186. Id. at 849.
187. Id.
188. For arguments that family law should adopt a similar pluralistic approach—based on Raz’s
work—see Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1568 (2009). For a critique of the pluralistic
approach in family law, see Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 317 (2016).
189. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).

04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete)

1432

12/20/2016 12:44 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1397

choice does not exist if a buyer can choose from among a hundred
houses that are all the same; an adequate choice would be, for example,
between a town house, a town apartment, and a suburban house.190 To
ensure adequacy of choice, Raz contends, it is not enough that the state
be committed to noninterference (negative liberty); rather, the state is
obligated to “create conditions which enable [its] subjects to enjoy
greater liberty than they otherwise would.” 191 Raz’s approach thus takes
incommensurability one step further because it posits that not only
should the state approve and accommodate different valuations, but that
it also actively needs to facilitate adequate choice.
Building on Raz’s view, Dagan celebrates the existence of, and
advocates further development of, structural pluralism—a private law
system that vindicates and embeds diverse values and facilitates
meaningful choice. 192 Structural pluralism, thus, is the mechanism that
incorporates the variety of choices that the state presents—a sort of a
menu of options that embeds diverse values. Accordingly, Dagan asserts,
“An autonomy-based pluralism must take seriously the state’s obligation
to provide a sufficiently diverse set of robust legal frameworks for
people to organize their lives.” 193 That is, the state’s role is to facilitate
varied spheres that incorporate diverse values, or balances of values, that
will enable effective choice.
The version of pluralism I refer to from here onward—unless
otherwise stated—is Dagan’s autonomy-based pluralism. For the sake of
simplicity, I often shorten it to “pluralistic theory.”
One should not confuse pluralistic theory with approaches grounded
in laissez-faire polices. While autonomy is one of the values that we
should incorporate into the menu of options, it is not the only one. This
pluralistic structure embeds the principles of value pluralism: the idea
that the world is composed of a plurality of ultimate goods, not just one,
and these goods cannot be ranked. 194 A structure that reflects value
pluralism is built on a commitment to offer options that integrate and
balance various values, rather than a world that vindicates mainly
autonomy. Indeed, value pluralism has never been an invitation to

190. Id. at 375.
191. Id. at 18–19.
192. HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE
LAW THEORY 163, 182 (2013).
193. Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism, supra note 29, at 1424.
194. GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 2 (2002).
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celebrate individual freedom over all other competing values.195 As
Dagan notes, “facilitation is rarely exhausted by a hands-off policy and a
corresponding hospitable attitude to freedom of contract. Rather,
facilitation requires the law’s active empowerment in providing
institutional arrangements, including reliable guarantees against
opportunistic behavior.” 196
I now move to examine how autonomy-based pluralism informs the
regulation of the P2P economy.
C.

Lessons from Pluralistic Theory

Pluralistic theory warrants that we depart from the dichotomy of selfregulation versus traditional regulation and treat increased access-toexcess activity as a new category with its own sets of regulatory rules—
thus allowing individuals substantive choice between activities. In what
follows, I first argue that access-to-excess-based activity vindicates
diverse human valuations and, as such, the state has an interest in
sustaining it. Second, I assert that a noninterventionist approach is antipluralistic because the lack of protective regulation will, in fact, diminish
choice to providers and consumers. Third, I claim that pluralistic
principles justify creation of a separate and novel regulatory regime that
is designed specifically to accommodate the distinctive nature of
activities in access-to-excess transactions. To entertain diversity of
options, pluralistic theory suggests that when the P2P economy is
different from the traditional market—and thus serves to extend
choice—new regulation that suits these activities is apposite. Fourth, I
demonstrate that efficiency considerations also justify the creation of a
separate category based on access to excess and thus comply with
pluralistic principles. Fifth, I contend that the new category should
distinguish between access-to-excess capacity on the one hand, and
conventional transactions on the other, to prevent incumbent-like
operations to pass as access-to-excess types of activities.
1.

Access-to-Excess-Based Activities Extend Choice and Vindicate
Different Human Valuations

The innovation found at the heart of the P2P economy—in terms both
of market and of social innovation—is best viewed as a choice-

195. William A. Galston, Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
769, 777 (1999).
196. Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism, supra note 29, at 1429.
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enhancing apparatus because it augments access to activities based on
excess capacity.
The relative ubiquity of cell phones and other technological advances
allow P2P facilitators to overcome long-existing problems of supply and
demand by easing the connections between providers and consumers.
The P2P economy thus reduces barriers to entrance into markets by
supporting transactions based on temporary access to excess capacity,
resulting in expansion of choice for providers and consumers.
When it comes to consumers, the P2P economy amplifies the
multitude of services and goods in the market. Looking through these
lenses, we can see that the virtue of the access-to-excess economy for
consumers is in accommodating different types of valuations. People
perceive what is important in diverse ways and the P2P economy
supports such different modes of valuation—in making them more
readily obtainable. To clarify, the innovation is not in creating new
goods or novel types of exchanges, but in the ease of transactions, which
intensifies and increases the availability of these options. Indeed, in the
PwC survey, 32% of respondents indicated that “more choice in the
marketplace” is a strong selling point for the P2P transportation firms. 197
For instance, if one wants to stay in traditional accommodations, she
can choose a hotel; if one wants a cheaper hotel, this is an option, too;
and if one is willing to take some risk or wants to experience “living like
a local,” then Airbnb offers yet another layer of supply. 198 The same
thing holds true for the other industries of the P2P economy. Some
people may value the interaction with people they do not know; others
may dislike the more intimate nature of some of these transactions; some
value their privacy more than others; and some are more risk-averse than
others. Some care more about price, while others favor efficiency and
predictability. Some want the convenience of using their cell phone to
find a low-cost ride; others opt for the safety associated with regulated
taxis or finding them spontaneously on the street. Some desire the
efficiency and experience of an agency that will conduct appropriate
screening in finding a babysitter; others trust the reviews of members,
whereas others are more suspicious. Some endorse the perceived benefit
of sustaining the environment or the sense of community provided by
P2P arrangements. The P2P economy creates the conditions for
197. CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES, supra note 17, at 20.
198. Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 166, at 105 (“One of the primary benefits that it provides is
that it allows guests to ‘live like a local’ and explore neighborhoods that do not typically cater to
tourists, both by providing accommodations in a wide variety of locales and by connecting visitors
with local residents.”).
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expanding the menu of options that accommodate many of these diverse
experiences.
When it comes to providers, the P2P economy extends options by
opening flexible employment structures, 199 although change in
employment structure also has negative consequences that could
decrease choice—a concern that I discuss in subsection 4. Again, the
innovation is not in the novelty of freelance employment structures but
in their increased availability. 200 The P2P economy offers flexible, parttime employment and increases the participation of nonprofessional
providers who want to make “some extra money.” 201 The model reduces
barriers to entering markets previously reserved to those whose full-time
work or expertise, for the most part, is the provision of such services.
For instance, Uber drivers may be former professional taxi drivers or
may be new drivers who provide rides only part time. 202 Airbnb hosts
could be owners of short-term units who have leased their units for years
using other platforms, or renters who wish to sublet their apartments
while they are away and make some extra income.
Essentially, pluralistic theory provides the theoretical framework for
the argument that the state ought to support the P2P economy as a way
to proactively cultivate different human choices. Thus, in terms of public
policy, the state should encourage the innovation of the P2P economy
because such action falls within its charge to facilitate adequate
alternatives. By validating people’s various valuations, the state allows
people to self-govern. Humans flourish when adequate, effective, and
different choices exist.
2.

Deregulation Is Anti-Pluralistic

The fact that access-to-excess-based activity falls under the aegis of
pluralistic principles does not mean that the state should let it operate
without constraints. In fact, pluralistic theory also calls for some limits—
in the form of direct regulation—on the P2P economy. From a

199. Cf. Alek Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor Law in the Crowdsourcing
Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 154 (2011) (describing the flexibility and comfort in
working in the crowdsourcing industry).
200. HILL, supra note 65, at 4–8.
201. Id. at 122 (noting that many P2P facilitators defend their practices as allowing people to
make some extra money—and not as a main source of income).
202. Jacob Davidson, Uber Reveals How Much Its Drivers Really Earn . . . Sort of, TIME (Jan.
22, 2015), http://time.com/money/3678389/uber-drivers-wages/ [http://perma.cc/M3Q9-95KM]
(indicating that the survey conducted by Uber found that “32% of drivers said the major reason for
partnering with Uber was ‘to earn money while looking for a steady, full-time job’”).
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theoretical standpoint, a noninterventionist approach results in a
preference for a narrow notion of autonomy over such other values as
labor rights, fair competition, and equity. Pluralistic theory, however,
demands a balance of values, which does not occur if the economy is
unregulated—as I argue below.
In the first place, a free-market approach is not compatible with the
pluralistic model because it would likely result in diminishing other
choices. “[T]he state’s obligation to foster diversity and multiplicity
cannot be properly accomplished through a hands-off attitude by the law
because such an attitude ‘would undermine the chances of survival of
many cherished aspects of our culture.’” 203 Adopting a nonintervention
policy in this context means conferring an advantage to the P2P
economy over other valued options (the incumbents) and thus displacing
the other options. If more traditional services use the P2P economy to
sell orthodox services—while not being subject to similar regulations—
they gain an unfair advantage over incumbents. And if incumbents
cannot survive the competition because the P2P intermediaries skirt
existing regulations, then the other choices may disappear—resulting in
fewer varieties that matter for some people.
For example, recent research found that Airbnb’s impact on the hotel
industry in Texas is unevenly distributed, and that Airbnb affects mostly
lower-end hotels, making them most vulnerable. 204 Likewise, there is
some anecdotal evidence that P2P ride companies have already affected
the availability of traditional taxi services in New York and San
Francisco. 205 Indeed, Yellow Cab, the largest taxi company in San
Francisco, has recently filed for bankruptcy, citing Uber and Lyft as the
main reason for its economic problems. 206 Thus, the idea of multiple
alternatives becomes illusory if it serves as a cover for a free-market
approach to regulation that results in the end, or diminished number, of
traditional and valuable options.

203. Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
19, 27 (2013) (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369, 372 (1986)).
204. Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, supra note 112, at 25.
205. Kate Rogers, Uber, Lyft Put Pressure on Taxi Companies, CNBC SMALL BUSINESS (Jan. 26,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/26/uber-lyft-put-pressure-on-taxi-companies.html [http://
perma.cc/V7GY-3RAN]; Michael Gartland, Taxi Shortage as Uber Lures Away Yellow Cabbies,
N.Y. POST (Oct. 19, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/10/19/taxi-shortage-as-uber-lures-away-yellowcabbies/ [http://perma.cc/36XK-2FHC].
206. Tim Stenovec, More Proof That Uber Is Killing the Taxi Industry, TECH INSIDER (Jan. 7,
2016), http://www.techinsider.io/more-proof-that-uber-is-killing-the-taxi-industry-2016-1 [http://
perma.cc/96BB-A8TW].
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Commitment to a balance of values also commends that the
regulations of the P2P economy ensure equal opportunity for people to
participate in the activities—as users and providers. Nonintervention in
this context may prevent or decrease the participation of women and
racial minorities in the P2P economy. Particularly, people who feel less
physically safe—for example, women and transgender people—may be
more concerned about taking a P2P ride or renting through Airbnb. 207
Indeed, approximately 70% of the providers in the P2P economy are
male. 208 Not only does nonintervention prevent the participation of
certain classes of people, but those same people also pay a premium if
traditional services are rarer or more expensive. Racial minorities’
participation can be halted, too, on both ends of the process—either
through the mechanism of peer ranking or through the possibility of not
hiring them or not accepting their requests to rent a property. Hands-off
policies thus create the possibility that certain groups will be shut out of
the P2P economy. Pluralistic theory, conversely, requires incorporating
diverse values, including equity.
Additionally, genuine choice for providers disappears if the P2P
economy results in significant reduction of stable, full-time, protected
work. 209 Part-time freelance employment may be a valuable commodity
to some, but as soon as it is the primary choice, people lose other,
substantive choices about their employment. 210 In addition, the
flexibility may be misleading, as often P2P firms reduce the elasticity of
this work model by penalizing those who are not available enough (for
example, deactivating drivers who do not provide enough services or
making it not worthwhile to work only limited hours). 211 The risk here
207. Lauren Kelley, Is the Sharing Economy Safe for Women?, SHAREABLE (July 24, 2012),
http://www.shareable.net/blog/is-the-sharing-economy-safe-for-women
[http://perma.cc/MJ98GG4S]; Mary Emily O'Hara, Lyft Driver Accused of Threatening Activist Monica Jones in
Transphobic Post, THE DAILY DOT (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.dailydot.com/irl/lyft-drivermonica-jones-location-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/Y4Y2-5FXX].
208. Jennifer Rossa, The Workers, BLOOMBERG BRIEFS (June 15, 2015), https://newsletters.
briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/the-workers-demographics
[http://perma.
cc/T96B-WSJK].
209. Lauren Weber, One in Three U.S. Workers Is a Freelancer, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2014/09/04/one-in-three-u-s-workers-is-a-freelancer/
[http://perma.cc/B39D-8J2H] (reporting that 1 in 3 workers is a freelancer).
210. Workers on Tap, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21637393-rise-demand-economy-poses-difficult-questions-workers-companies-and
[http://perma.cc/YZ4M-2KTH] (“But workers who value security over flexibility, including a lot of
middle-aged lawyers, doctors and taxi drivers, feel justifiably threatened.”).
211. Sarah Leberstein & Rebecca Smith, Rights on Demand: Ensuring Workplace Standards and
Worker Security in the On-Demand Economy, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 6 (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.nelp.org/publication/rights-on-demand/ [http://perma.cc/UEP9-HY38].

04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete)

1438

12/20/2016 12:44 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1397

from the P2P economy is imminent: we see the rapid proliferation of
1099-MISC employees—part-time workers who are ineligible for
various protections that regular employees have and are much cheaper
for the employer. 212 Since voluminous rights and benefits are attached to
full-time employment (such as health insurance), the growth of freelance
labor constitutes a risk to the future of many employees.
Importantly, deregulation is unwarranted because many of the
policies that regulation of the traditional economy intends to promote are
still applicable to the P2P economy. For instance, the main reasons that
municipalities and the federal government have regulated the taxi market
include limiting market entrants to prevent overcrowding and the
resulting negative consequences, 213 requiring licensing for safety,
controlling distribution of risk (in terms of insurance), 214 and in some
instances imposing taxes to incentivize more socially beneficial
behaviors such as using mass transit. 215
Most of these justifications to enact regulations are still relevant
today. Problems of safety, distribution of risk, and discrimination have
not dissipated with the appearance of the P2P economy. Some of them
are, in fact, exacerbated because some of the market operates on the
boundaries between market and household. The costs of allowing P2P
firms to subvert these regulations can result in overcrowding and
increased traffic, decreased safety, price manipulation, and increased
competition while neglecting socially beneficial conduct like walking or
taking mass transit. 216 In addition, incumbent participants may have

212. HILL, supra note 65, at 6–8.
213. Posen, supra note 130, at 409–10.
214. Id.
215. Sam Frizell, A Historical Argument Against Uber: Taxi Regulations Are There for a Reason,
TIME (Nov. 19, 2014), http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history/ [http://perma.cc/M6RR-UWBA];
see also Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Ass’n, Taxis, TNCs and Deregulation: Is History
Repeating Itself?, WHO’S DRIVING YOU, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/history-repeating-itself
[http://perma.cc/H7DJ-FU7E].
216. Among the detriments of Uber’s lack of regulation in some municipalities are: potential for
monopoly, unsafe cars and drivers, privacy issues, discrimination, and inadequate pay and working
conditions for drivers. See Rogers, supra note 23, at 91. Regarding the P2P economy’s effect on
mass transit, see Hill, supra note 151; Tarun Wadhwa, Could Lyft and Uber Put Public Transit Out
of Business?, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
tarunwadhwa/2014/11/13/will-lyft-and-ubers-shared-ride-service-put-public-transit-out-ofbusiness/#67878d371f58 [https://perma.cc/PEJ4-L7ZL] (“Expect this new type of corporate
carpooling to serve as both a competitor and a complement to existing public transit.”).
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substantial sunk costs––medallions, taxis, business goodwill––and are
subject to unfair competition from an unregulated new entrant. 217
Thus, there is no justification to apply different rules to the P2P
economy when the same grounds for regulation still exit. Applying those
rules unevenly, by choosing nonintervention in the P2P market, results
in an unjustified harm to incumbents. This is particularly so when the
only difference between incumbent industries and those in the P2P
economy is that operating an under-regulated business is cheaper. In this
way, nonintervention is antipluralistic because it erodes variety by
allowing unfair competition against the remaining incumbent players.
Certainly, a pluralistic standpoint justifies different regulatory
treatments for different activities: multiple regulatory approaches to
various activities. For instance, a pluralistic approach justifies and
encourages different legal responses to the fact that P2P technology
reduces the problem of price manipulation in P2P rides. But it does not
mean that policies that are still relevant to preventing harms should be
set aside in the name of “choice.” Pluralism does not mean a license to
compete unfairly by supplanting exiting regulations,—but only that
when differences in types of valuations exist, they should be treated
disparately in terms of regulation.
3.

Pluralism Commends Novel and Specially Designed Regulation

While nonintervention is antipluralistic, applying the current regime
to access-to-excess transactions will, as well, not further pluralistic
principles. Some regulation is necessary, but it need not be the same
rules that are imposed on incumbent markets. Pluralistic principles call
on the state to actively enhance variety by treating different values and
valuations with distinct regulations. New regulation should leverage the
role of P2P platforms and preserve the freedom and innovation that the
access-to-excess-based activities enable.
Current regulations are too burdensome for (part of) the current
market and are ill-suited to the types of actors involved in access-toexcess transactions. Applying the existing regime can result (and has
resulted) in a market that operates unlawfully and inefficiently, creating
risk for some players and preventing the participation of others. For
instance, one of the domains of the P2P economy is in the pop-up
restaurant scene, which connects potential clients with amateur chefs for
ad-hoc meals outside an established restaurant (often in the chef’s
217. Rogers, supra note 23, at 91 (“Uber has faced criticism . . . that it is unfairly competing with
taxi drivers by entering their market without following regulations or fare schedules.”).
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home). 218 But even inviting some consumers to a home-cooked
commercial dinner potentially requires complying with complex
regulations, such as accommodations in line with the Americans with
Disabilities Act, environmental regulations, and health and safety
regulations. 219 And while many of these regulations still serve an
important function, the organizer of a pop-up dinner can find them
overwhelming—thus, they can result either in noncompliance or in
preventing entrance into the market. Therefore, even if current
regulations fix market failures that still exist or serve an important public
health function relevant in access-to-excess transactions, pluralistic
principles call on the state to support these transactions by treating them
differently than those reflecting traditional commercial undertakings.
In terms of pluralistic principles, the state’s obligation to facilitate
multiplicity means that the state needs—upon commercial demand, or
even without it—to broaden people’s choices by proactively enabling
innovation in the form of new types of regulation. 220 Innovation, in this
sense, means that the state ought to think creatively about different
forms of regulations that are suitable to the multiple activities,
valuations, and variations that exist in the access-to-excess market.
Pluralistic theory then suggests that lawmakers should create additional
regulatory choices that champion increased options. That is, choice
about regulation of the P2P economy cannot be limited to “traditional”
or “none.” 221
A pluralistic approach to the regulation of the P2P economy thus
directs that the state should create a separate category that governs the
access-to-excess model. The existence of a separate category does not
mean that its regime should be based on a laissez-faire model. Rather,
this novel category should have its own set of rules—neither traditional
nor deregulatory—that will enable substantive choice between options.
Pluralistic theory insists that the state ought to fix market failures, thus
allowing effective choice by maintaining the viability of different

218. Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants,
and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16 (2015).
219. Id. at 20.
220. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, Freedom of Contracts: The Choice Theory of
Contractual Obligation (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) [https://perma.cc/PEJ4-L7ZL].
221. While Dagan contends that the state should promote even less desirable alternatives (i.e.,
those that are not often used) and such options that embed “utopian” views, I believe that too many
options can result in less choice. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
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services. 222 A separate category requires regulation that encourages
innovation but still prevents exploitation and barriers to participation.
Lawmakers should tailor such regulations to their particular contexts.
As the players in this market are unsophisticated microbusinesses that do
not repeat transactions between identical parties, the regulations should
take a form that enables participation. 223 Lawmakers should design
procedures that are simple to understand—“in plain English” for
“ordinary” (nonbusiness) people. Information must be effortlessly
accessible. And the compliance process should not be overly
burdensome (e.g., does not require a physical visit to the relevant
administrative agency, but can be done via the web). The regulations
should not require legal counsel so that following them is not
prohibitively expensive.
Such regulations should create an intermediate status befitting the
nature of these now-popular access-to-excess-based activities. For
example, as Dagan and Heller suggest, the state should create a new
category of employment for P2P providers. 224 Rather than employee
versus nonemployee, the state should develop an intermediate category
of employment suitable for unsophisticated part-timers who use excess
capacity—but still work for companies that exercise a strong degree of
control over providers. At the least, such a category should enforce both
the minimum wage and antidiscrimination protections. Similarly, Doug
Hass, a labor law attorney, proposes the creation of a new employment
category of “dependent contractor status” to give some basic protection
to P2P providers—while still recognizing the flexibility inherent in such
employment structure. 225 Alan Krueger and Seth Harris likewise

222. For instance, while many municipalities limit the number of taxi medallions, Uber and the
other P2P transportation companies do not need to follow the same process; thus, they can flood the
market with their drivers and harm the ability of traditional taxi drivers to earn a decent salary
(devaluing the worth of the medallion). An intervention that prevents unfair competition supports
the existence of a marketplace that allows effective choice. See Rogers, supra note 23, at 87, 89–90;
Emily Badger, Taxi Medallions Have Been the Best Investment in America for Years. Now Uber
May Be Changing That, WASH POST (June 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/20/taxi-medallions-have-been-the-best-investment-in-america-foryears-now-uber-may-be-changing-that [https://perma.cc/2QDH-ZPDQ].
223. Administrative work, as Elizabeth Emens recently argued, takes time and mental energy that
is typically unrecognized by the law. Therefore, she suggests that the government should reduce the
level of administrative work it imposes on people. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J.
1409, 1464 (2015).
224. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 220, at 139–40.
225. Douglas A. Hass, Protecting the Sharing Economy: A Proposal for FLSA Dependent
Contractor Status, THE DAY SHIFT (Sept. 22, 2015), http://dayshift.com/2015/09/22/protecting-thesharing-economy-creating-an-flsa-dependent-contractor-status/56/ [https://perma.cc/EPG7-GVKW].
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conceive of an “independent worker” status that would grant employeelike protections to workers in the P2P economy; these benefits would
include antidiscrimination protections, employer tax withholding, and
employer contributions to Social Security and Medicare. 226 Reflecting
this prerogative, the National Employment Law Project offers a policy
that assures core labor protections, privacy protections, Social Security
benefits, and more, for P2P workers. 227
Pluralistic theory can even direct that more options for flexible
employment exist—for example, based on full-time or part-time
employment; the period in which the provider works for the company; or
other factors, such as exclusivity of the workplace (e.g., whether the
provider works solely for one company or for more). 228
The same is true for the concern about risk allocation. A new category
should impose insurance requirements that protect users and providers
alike. Pluralistic theory prescribes that, because people fail to defend
themselves against small probabilities of high-consequence events, the
state should impose insurance requirements that mitigate market failures;
by so doing, the state actively safeguards players in the P2P economy.
At the same time, these state-imposed requirements should not constitute
barriers to participation in the market, recognizing that workers in the
access-to-excess economy are not full-time workers. Additionally, the
state’s commitment to a multiplicity of options requires that it actively
seek to offer a range of insurance options appropriate to these situations.
4.

Efficiency Rationale for a Separate Category

Efficiency concerns also serve as an underlying rationale for a regime
based on multiple institutions. 229 This is not just to say that the P2P
226. Krueger, supra note 177. See also Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for
Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker”, THE
HAMILTON PROJECT (Dec. 2015), www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_
for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris [https://perma.cc/9uay-cx4m].
227. Leberstein & Smith, supra note 211.
228. While pluralistic principles support creation of more employment structures, they also need
to ensure that there are not so many options that the choice becomes too complicated. Too much
choice can result in an inability to choose, and thus is inefficient. See generally, BARRY SCHWARTZ,
THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 3 (2004).
229. Dagan contends that “[a]rguably, efficiency may also serve as the normative foundation of
structural pluralism, but for this it is not enough to show that efficiency considerations underlie
many rules of various private law institutions.” Dagan, supra note 29, at n.7. Dagan explains that
autonomy-based pluralism even dictates the creation of alternatives with marginal demand—and the
creation of such alternatives is not supported by the efficiency rationale. Discussing efficiency in the
particular context does not mean that the state should facilitate multiple regimes only when they are
efficient—but, rather, that in the context of the P2P economy, efficiency is a major normative
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economy promotes efficiency—but, further, that a menu of options with
a particular category of access-to-excess transactions would promote
efficiency as another value. In order for the regulatory regimes to
provide meaningful choice among institutions, the options should be
different from one another, their rules easy to understand, and they
should be attractive to users. Put differently, a separate regulatory
regime grounded in pluralistic principles must promote efficiency
considerations. 230 Efficiency in this context means that the players—
consumers and providers alike—can have ex ante, low-cost availability
of information about the governing law. 231 To choose among options,
the players must be able to predict with certainty whether they are
operating legally, whether they are risking litigation, and which
regulatory obligations they should follow. Conversely, lack of clarity
and certainty about the law increases the costs of operating in the market
and serves as a barrier to participation.232 Individuals’ ability to selfgovern requires that the options be clear, certain, and effective. As
Richard Epstein put it, “permanence and stability are the cardinal virtues
of the legal rules that make private innovation and public progress
possible.” 233 This is true in a regime operated by sophisticated players—
and thus especially so in one worked by nonprofessionals. 234
Currently, many participants in the P2P economy not only operate
unlawfully, but they are also unsure about the paths they need to follow
to comply with regulations. 235 Accordingly, creation of a new category
would legalize the activity and clarify the regulatory requirements. For
foundation for creation of multiple options and thus provides another rationale for creating a
separate regime for access-to-excess-based activities.
230. This is not to say that all options comprising a menu of options must promote efficiency.
Dagan argues that the state must also promote lesser-preferred options and “utopian” types of
options. However, my concern is that categories that are not used are confusing (because there may
be too many options) and can create an administrative burden. See also Erez Aloni, Registering
Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 599–602 (2013) (discussing the problems in creating a menu of
options—in the context of family law—in which regimes are not practical and are not being used).
In the case of the P2P economy, the discussion is theoretical because it is clear that a separate
category based on access to excess will be used frequently.
231. Cf. Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1153 (2000) (explaining efficiency approach as relevant to choice of law rules).
232. Id.
233. RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD xii (1995).
234. Urs Gasser, The Sharing Economy: Disruptive Effects on Regulation and Paths Forward,
RISK DIALOGUE MAG. (June 16, 2016), http://cgd.swissre.com/risk_dialogue_magazine/
Digital_Economy/sharing_economy_disruptive_effects.html [http://perma.cc/ZC6P-QZ98] (arguing
that regulation is necessary to help nonprofessional consumers and providers understand processes
such as collecting taxes and obtaining insurance).
235. See, e.g., Loucks, supra note 129, at 338.
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example, providers should have easy access to information about their
employment status, the insurance requirements, and tax implications in
order to make a worthwhile choice to work in the area and in order to
maximize wealth. 236 Consumers should be able to find out effortlessly
whether they are violating zoning laws, which taxes they need to pay (if
any), and whether the ride they are taking is sufficiently safe and
insured. Having a category that is different from traditional activity will
ensure that people can exchange things lawfully while minimizing the
costs of legal uncertainty. This is because imposing the onerous
regulations that currently exist would result either in deterring
individuals from entering into the market 237 or in driving them to break
the law. Conversely, a new regime tailored to deal with small-scale
transactions and unsophisticated sellers will enable such transactions.
Furthermore, a separate regime, with clear rules that will increase
participation and compliance with the law, will impede the lost benefits
that stem from evasion of the law. Without such a regime, the risk is a
market that operates underground and without increasing social
benefits—such as nonpayment of tax. 238 A separate category that
legalizes the activity will be efficient for the state, too.
Finally, having a regime built on access to excess bolsters efficiency
because it minimizes Coasean transaction costs, including “search costs,
information costs and adverse selection; negotiation and drafting costs;
behavioral costs like agency costs, moral hazard, and shirking; and
monitoring and enforcement costs.” 239
The way that better access (more choice) intersects with efficiency is
evident in the innovation of Uber and other P2P transportation services.
Uber’s innovation, Brishen Rogers observes, is in eliminating the taxi
marketplace’s main problem: the search cost. 240 Two main difficulties
increase the search cost in the traditional market place.241 First, when (or

236. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet
Discussion Forums, TUL. PUB. L. RES. PAPER & B.C. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER (2016)
(study of online interactions of P2P ride providers found that they lacked knowledge—or had
confusing and inaccurate knowledge—of some tax aspects).
237. Allen & Berg, supra note 12, at 30.
238. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 231, at 1153.
239. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 231 (2010).
240. Rogers, supra note 23, at 88–89.
241. The economic activities of the P2P ride companies can be akin to access-to-excess-based
activity in some cases but not in others. It can be an access-to-excess-based activity to the extent
that the driver does not use his/her car mainly for professional transportation and that working as a
driver gives the customer temporary access to the driver’s skills (for instance, when the driver
provides the service as an extra job while being a full-time student). But the driver could have a car
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where) cabs are rarely available, consumers will not try to find one.
Second, passengers will sometimes take a randomly passing taxi while
waiting for their ordered one; and, similarly, cab drivers would prefer
picking up a random passenger to answering a call from the dispatcher.
Uber, Lyft, and others overcome these problems with their on-demand
model. Hence, customers can see when a ride is arriving and are less
likely to take a passing alternative (passengers pay a cancellation fee if
they cancel rides five minutes after the order); drivers cannot pick up
random passengers. 242 Therefore, P2P ride services expanded the choice
for consumers by providing minute-to-minute supply in a market with
minute-to-minute demand—and by minimizing the cost of the ride.
5.

New Regulations Should Prevent Incumbent-Like Firms from
Passing as Excess Providers to Evade Regulation

Another fundamental principle is that a new category must ensure
distinctions between activities based on temporary access to excess
capacity and conventional activity without excess capacity. 243 The
regulations should prevent manipulation, artificial increase of capacity,
and exploitation based on a façade of excess capacity. Examples of such
manipulations: using a property as a mini-hotel or a car as a full-time
taxi—while avoiding the legal requirements that are attached to such
activities. Adopting a noninterventionist approach would allow excessin-disguise types of activities to operate conventional businesses while
evading regulation. Such results are contrary to the pluralistic approach
and would result in harms to others, as I analyze below.
To respond to this concern, the regulations should distinguish
between activities in excess capacity and those that are not. Such
distinction, obviously, already manifests some normative judgment of
what “excess capacity” means. For example, the use of someone’s sofa
for an entire year can be seen as capitalizing excess capacity or as a
conventional use of space for sale. But pluralistic theory does not shy

that is used mainly for transportation—as with some taxi drivers—and work full time as a driver. In
such cases, this is not an access-to-excess-based activity, as it is not leveraging existing capacity.
242. Rogers, supra note 23, at 88.
243. Distinguishing between access-to-excess-based activities and standard exchanges depends
on the particular sector and requires a flexible framework. However, the basic principle is
capitalizing existing capacity—not creating a new one. In distinguishing between the categories, the
two relevant factors are the period that the provider works and the existing utilization. Using one’s
capacity (for instance, one’s space or car) without acquiring another more capacity is evidence of
excess capacity. Conversely, long and constant use of assets, goods, or skills indicates that the
provider is not capitalizing or increasing capacity—but, rather, operating a traditional business.
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away from normative judgments—it embraces what Dagan calls
“moderate perfectionism” in ascertaining the appropriate balance
between competing values. 244 So, the decision of what falls under the
separate category is based upon the principle of balanced values—an
examination of the balance of values that are embedded within each
category.
The regulation of the P2P economy should thus require that directives
separate traditional activity from excess-capacity activities to assure fair
competition. As I discuss in section D, 245 a few municipalities have
already established such policies—in the areas of short-term rentals and
transportation—that distinguish between activities that are based on
excess capacities and traditional exchanges in disguise.
Regarding employment, the category of access to excess must
distinguish between workers who use excess time and energy and
workers who substitute their labor in the P2P market for time they would
otherwise spend in incumbent markets. The latter group includes
providers who work full time, similarly to conventional employees. 246
Indeed, many workers in the P2P economy do not rely on it as their
primary source of income—one survey found that 38% of P2P workers
are students. 247 However, 29% of workers in this survey indicated that
75–100% of their income comes from working in the P2P economy. 248
Working as a full-time employee but without employee rights and
protections harms these workers because they are ineligible for basic
protections such as those provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act and
by antidiscrimination laws. 249 Additionally, having these workers
operate as independent contractors allows the P2P companies to compete
unfairly. In 2016, Uber drivers filed a class-action lawsuit in which they
argue that the company lowers its operating costs by misclassifying its
drivers as “independent contractors” rather than “employees.” 250 In this

244. Dagan, supra note 29, at 1429–37 (“Although private law, loyal to its pluralism, is careful
not to impose one-size-fits-all prescriptions, it is still a profoundly normative—indeed
perfectionist—practice.”).
245. See infra section II.D.
246. By “full time,” I mean not only the number of hours per week that the driver works—but
also the period of time in which she does so. Thus, working full time during a limited period is
different from driving full time the entire year.
247. Rossa, supra note 208.
248. Id.
249. Felstiner, supra note 199, at 170.
250. Zawada v. Uber Techns., Inc., No. 16-cv-11334 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2016). The plaintiffs
posit that, under Michigan state law, the independent contractor status mischaracterizes the
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way, the plaintiffs argue, the company is able to compete with traditional
taxi providers, who are required to pay their drivers all that the law
mandates. 251
The law already recognizes that designating employees as
“independent contractors” does not mean that they really are. The law
employs a multifactor test that examines the function of the worker,
rather than her title. 252 Therefore, courts already have the tools to compel
companies to distinguish between employees-in-disguise and those who
genuinely work in an excess capacity. 253 When a provider works full
time for a P2P company, she is more akin to a taxi driver and should
have heightened employee protections. As for those who work part time
and for whom the P2P work is not their main source of income, they
should be included in the special category of access to excess, explained
in subsection 3.
Of course, the distinction between who is a “standard” full-time
worker and who is an access-to-excess-based worker is not as binary.
Yet, the law of employment—pertaining to the definition of
“employee”—is rarely rigid and typically deals with distinctions. 254
One could argue that designating approximately 30% of current P2P
workers as “employees” would decrease their choice, as—most likely—
P2P firms would deactivate (discharge) them. I argue that pluralistic
principles justify such result. This is because full-time access-to-excessbased workers are not using their excess assets or skills and, as a result,

relationship between Uber and its employees: Uber closely oversees each part of the process,
including performing background checks on prospective drivers, regulating driver performance via
user ratings, and setting nonnegotiable salaries. The company also prohibits drivers from soliciting
their own customers and retains the sole discretion of firing an Uber driver based on failure to meet
Uber’s nonnegotiable metrics. As a result, Uber drivers unjustifiably lose traditional employee
benefits, such as minimum wage, itemized wage statements, overtime premium pay, workers’
compensation, paid vacation time, and health insurance.
251. In recent years, other P2P-economy companies outside of the transportation arena have been
accused of misclassifying workers as “independent contractors” in order to compete unfairly. See,
for example, Zenelaj v. Handybook, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2015), in which a classaction lawsuit was brought against Handybook, a housecleaning P2P service, by its workers, and
Otey v. Crowdflower, No. 12-5524 (N.D. Cal. 2014). In Otey, Crowdflower, a P2P service that
outsources miscellaneous tasks to workers, was sued by its workers, who cited minimum wage
violations on account of the workers’ misclassification as independent contractors. Id. Rather than
allow a court to decide the worker classification issue, Crowdflower settled the case for more than
$500,000. Id.
252. See Felstiner, supra note 199, at 171–72.
253. Leberstein & Smith, supra note 211, at 1 (“[M]any individuals working in the on-demand
economy are employees, and their employers should treat them as such.”).
254. See, e.g., Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 45–46 (2009) (discussing the value of labor flexibility).
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gain an unfair advantage over professional workers who are subject to
regulation. As such, the full-time-workers-in-disguise are harming other
professionals—i.e., those who participate in the same market, but whose
workforce is more expensive because they comply with regulations.
When incumbent-like actors masquerade as members of the P2P
marketplace, they do not add variety, they erode it––both by competing
unfairly against the remaining incumbent players and by occupying the
space that a true innovator would otherwise occupy. To wit, if someone
uses her private car to operate a taxi-like service, she is doing the same
work as others but devaluing the medallions that the latter had to
purchase. 255 Similarly, if someone offers handyman services on a fulltime basis, he competes with companies that hire employees and give
them paid sick days, benefits, and so forth. Workers should be free to
choose between working at a job that offers benefits but provides less
autonomy, or giving up security and benefits in favor of flexibility and
entrepreneurship. But this does not mean that workers should do the
same work—except, without any rights—as one who works for a non–
app-based company. Such pattern supports unfair competition and
generates “second-class” workers without job security and basic
benefits. So, distinguishing between increased excess capacity and
traditional services—even if doing so does not allow some professionals
to participate in this market—still adheres to pluralistic principles by
preserving consumers’ and providers’ abilities to make meaningful
choices in varied markets of satisfactory goods and services.
There are still open questions about what such “pluralistic-vision”
regulations will look like. The next section moves to real-life examples,
discussing regulatory regimes that conform to the normative orders of
pluralistic theory and some that do not.
D.

Test Cases

Since the rise of the P2P economy, state and municipality
policymakers have experimented with a variety of regulatory schemes.
Some are good examples of a pluralistic approach while others adopted
regulations that are inconsistent with pluralistic principles.

255. As a result of P2P transportation companies’ entrance into industry, the price of medallions
has fallen sharply. See Gartland, supra note 205. The way that municipalities have allocated
medallions has long been a problem, as they have often allocated an insufficient amount, which
created a taxi shortage. This does not mean that lawmakers should allow the market to solve this
problem by flooding the market with taxi-like cars that do not need medallions—but, rather, that
cities should allocate more medallions.
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In both the short-term rentals and transportation arenas there are, in
general, three common approaches: nonintervention (or unsuccessful
attempts to intervene); regulation that is akin to banning—or drastically
limiting—the P2P economy; and an intermediate approach that supports
the activities but restrains their harms.
In the short-term rentals sector, a nonintervention approach is
antipluralistic. Such approach allows providers to operate residential
property as hotels. The result of such regimes can be a decrease in rental
housing and lost tax revenue to the municipality—in addition to other
nuisances to the neighbors. 256 Such an approach perhaps increases
choice for some tourists and affords extra income for renters, but those
limited benefits come at the price of harm to others—neighbors, hotels,
and taxpayers.
On the other end of the spectrum are municipalities that chose a
complete ban or very restrictive rules. In Santa Barbara, California, for
example, short-term residential rentals, including vacation rentals and
“time share projects,” are regulated as “hotels,” meaning, in effect, that
they need to comply with burdensome regulations and, in effect, are
prohibited. 257 Such an approach is antipluralistic, too. The consequence
of such a regime is that short-term rentals go “underground” and all tax
revenues are lost. Simultaneously, short-term rental visitors may choose
to vacation in other places that offer such options. And owners of shortterm rentals lose the benefit of the extra income and of capitalizing on
their under-utilized properties.
Between these two poles are varieties of regulatory approaches that
facilitate the use of excess capacity but prevent the harmful
consequences of nonintervention. The principles of one such approach
are promulgated by the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM). 258 This

256. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, The Airbnb Effect, S.F. CHRON. (July 12, 2015),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/airbnb-impact-san-francisco-2015/#1
[http://perma.cc/V8LQ-JJKX]
(finding that in San Francisco at least 350 entire homes listed on Airbnb appear to be full-time
vacation rentals—in a city “wracked by a housing crisis, where a typical year sees just 2,000 new
units added, a few hundred units off the market makes a significant dent”).
257. Santa Barbara states the scope of hotel regulation as:
A building, group of buildings or a portion of a building which is designed for or occupied as
the temporary abiding place of individuals for less than thirty (30) consecutive days including,
but not limited to establishments held out to the public as auto courts, bed and breakfast inns,
hostels, inns, motels, motor lodges, time share projects, tourist courts, and other similar uses.
SANTA BARBARA, CAL., VACATION RENTALS, http://www.santabarbaraca.gov/services/
planning/mpe/vacation_rentals.asp [http://perma.cc/8GZ3-76KU].
258. THE U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, ADOPTED RESOLUTION: PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH VISITORS INDUSTRY (2012), http://www.strsantabarbara.org/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2015/10/STRSB-Exhibit-B.pdf [http://perma.cc/LT54-EM2D].
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policy relies on a balance of considerations: on the one hand, hotel taxes
are important to the existence of cities, and short-term rentals can
provide more of them; tourists bring more economic opportunities to the
city; homeowners benefit from renting their home and getting income
from their excess capacity; and simple regulations can enforce tax
collection and compliance by owners. At the same time, onerous and
complicated regulations will result in the industry’s going underground
and the loss of taxes. The USCM thus announced:
[S]upport for economic development opportunities through the
visitors industry by encouraging regulations of the short-term
rental industry that (1) establish a reliable way for the
municipality to identify and contact the short-term rental owner;
(2) make the tax collection and remittance obligations clear to
the short-term rental owner; and (3) treat short-term rental
tenants the same as long-term rental tenants. 259
There are many variations of such intermediate approaches that are
compatible with the pluralistic approach, and several municipalities
follow such plans. For examples, San Francisco, 260 Austin, 261 and
Nashville 262 all created special regimes that legalize short-term rental but
restrict it to the use of excess capacity. Their approaches differ in the
details, but what they have in common is that they allow homeowners to
rent their apartments for short times—but also limit and supervise those
rentals. Thus, in all of them, the homeowner must register her property
or apply for a permit if she wants to use it for short rentals. In San
Francisco, the owner or tenant cannot rent for more than ninety days a
year—a rule that prevents the creation of units that function as hotels.
Renters are also required to pay hotel tax—collected by the facilitator
(the P2P firm). 263 In Austin and San Francisco, the owner also needs to
give a proof of insurance. All the aforementioned cities have also beefed
up enforcements efforts (attempts to find noncomplying rentals).
259. Id. These principles are not entirely consistent with pluralistic principles, as they advocate
treating short-term rentals the same as long-term rentals—while I propose to treat them differently.
Yet, they are helpful in showing a balanced approach and the goals advanced by such approach.
260. Office of Short-Term Rental Registry & FAQs, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING DEP’T,
http://www.sf-planning.org/index.aspx?page=4004 [http://perma.cc/EK83-9DF4].
261. Vacation Rental Licensing, AUSTIN, TX., CODE DEP’T, http://www.austintexas.gov/str
[http://perma.cc/5ANZ-7HXW].
262. Short Term Rental Property, NASHVILLE, TN., CONSTRUCTION AND PERMITS,
http://www.nashville.gov/Codes-Administration/Construction-and-Permits/Short-TermRentals.aspx [http://perma.cc/6MA7-JUPC].
263. Stephen Fishman, Overview of Airbnb in San Francisco, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/overview-airbnb-law-san-francisco.html [http://perma.cc/LD7U-QRW9].
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The regulations enacted by these cities are still open to debate and
criticism by both sides. 264 Some argue that these cities impede
innovation by imposing administrative barriers (such as registration) that
will be most harmful to those who have difficulty engaging with such
administrative tasks. 265 But the point is that the regulations are subject to
constant reforms and changes. 266 I do not claim that they are perfect—
only that they try to strike a balance between enabling more choice and
preventing the harm of a laissez-faire regime. They encourage increased
excess use while banning commercial use in disguise.
In the transportation field, the account is somewhat similar. While
some municipalities chose a total ban on Uber-type entities 267 and others
responded by nonintervention, a third approach—more in accord with
pluralistic principles—is starting to emerge. Such a regime subjects the
P2P ride companies to some restrictions, typically those relevant to the
safety of passengers. California, for instance, created a new category of
transportation, “transportation network companies.” 268 The providers for
P2P ride companies can only operate in their own private cars (thus,
restricting the practice to those who use excess capacity). The rules also
require companies to “[conduct] criminal background checks for each
driver, establish a driver training program, implement a zero-tolerance
policy on drugs and alcohol, and require insurance coverage.” 269 This
264. See, e.g., Natalia Ciolko, There Goes the Neighborhood, THE AUSTIN CHRON. (Aug. 11,
2015,
10:39
AM),
http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2015-08-11/there-goes-theneighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/9LVH-TZNZ] (reporting how, despite the regulations, the market
for short-term rentals still harms the residents in Austin).
265. Indeed, the regulations in San Francisco are also in terms of procedures—they require that
hosts register in person. Fishman, supra note 263.
266. See, e.g., Lee Romney, Tracey Lien & Matt Hamilton, Airbnb Wins the Vote in San
Francisco, but City’s Housing Debate Rages On, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:40 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-airbnb-san-francisco-vote-housing-debate220151104-htmlstory.html [http://perma.cc/6LEM-AXC6] (reporting about a measure, rejected in a
popular vote, that proposed restricting the number of days a host can rent her apartment).
267. See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, Virginia Trying to Put Brakes on Taxi-Like Services, WASH. POST
(June
26,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2014/06/26/65d83a3e-fc8511e3-b1f4-8e77c632c07b_story.html?utm_term=.1835a58f3688
[https://perma.cc/NQV9-KH38]
(reporting that the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles issued cease-and-desist letters to both
Uber and Lyft).
268. TNC is defined as “an organization . . . that provides prearranged transportation services for
compensation using an online-enabled application (app) or platform to connect passengers with
drivers using their personal vehicles.” PUB. UTIL. COMM. OF THE STATE OF CAL., PROPOSED
DECISION OF COMMISSIONER PEEVEY, DECISION ADOPTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TO PROTECT
PUBLIC SAFETY WHILE ALLOWING NEW ENTRANTS TO THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 24 (Sept.
19, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K122/77122741.PDF
[http://perma.cc/RZ4W-G5RK].
269. Id.
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kind of regulation is consistent with pluralistic principles because it
allows the use of privately owned cars and ensures passenger safety,
while still cultivating the economic activity.
A contested and highly charged issue is that of fingerprinting the
drivers of P2P ride firms. Uber and Lyft recently left Austin (Texas)
after a bill to overturn the fingerprinting requirement was defeated in a
referendum. 270 Lyft and Uber invested $8.6 million in this ballot
campaign. Similarly, Boston police recently started to fingerprint Uber
and Lyft drivers. 271 A few other municipalities are also debating whether
to enact such a requirement. 272 On the one hand, opponents of
fingerprinting argue that the problem is that, due to deficiencies in the
FBI database, it can limit job prospects for people who have not been
convicted of a crime. On the other hand, fingerprinting is often required
of drivers in traditional transportation firms (in some municipalities, all
taxi drivers must be fingerprinted; in some, only limousine drivers).
Pluralistic theory principles can help here, too: a separate category based
on access to excess does not warrant any differences in terms of safety
between conventional and access-to-excess-based activity. Nothing in
the creation of a category of access to excess need lead to compromises
on safety requirements and different treatment between the categories.
Thus, pluralistic principles can support imposing a fingerprinting
requirement on drivers. To the extent that the FBI database has
problems, not only should a serious effort be made to correct the errors,
but also anyone who is unfairly denied a job because of such errors must
be allowed to show that the data is mistaken.
Multiple variations of regulations that comport with the pluralistic
idea have evolved. But perhaps this is also the shortcoming of pluralistic
theory—it may be too elastic and not provide a concrete answer to
specific regulatory questions. The next part explores this possible
deficiency.

270. Douglas MacMillan & Rachel Emma Silverman, Uber, Lyft Shut Down in Austin Over
Fingerprint Vote, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-capital-city-votesto-keep-fingerprinting-for-uber-lyft-drivers-1462796972 [http://perma.cc/A4S2-9RV4].
271. Curt Woodward, Boston Police Are Fingerprinting Taxi Drivers, But Uber Says It Won’t
Budge, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2016/02/23/boston-policeare-fingerprinting-taxi-drivers-but-uber-says-it-wont-budge/ [http://perma.cc/EEM5-3GPX].
272. Associated Press, Ex-Obama Official Helps Uber in Opposing Fingerprint-Based
Background Checks, WASH. POST (June 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/ex-obama-official-helps-uber-in-opposing-fingerprint-based-backgroundchecks/2016/06/08/1d43c174-2da9-11e6-b5db-e9bc84a2c8e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/YN6RB6S8].
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III. WHAT THE P2P ECONOMY TEACHES ABOUT
PLURALISTIC THEORY
The emerging P2P economy and the regulatory responses provide an
important lesson about the limitations of pluralistic theory and its
interpretation. In this part, I argue that the P2P economy teaches that
while pluralistic theory is valuable in producing general principles, it
falls short in instructing vis-à-vis the particular details. Further,
pluralistic rhetoric may camouflage the adoption of free-market policies
under the guise of pluralism.
The P2P economy can serve as a real-life laboratory to examine the
way principles of pluralistic theory function in practice. This is because,
although the P2P economy has not embedded some of the main
principles of pluralism (so far, many municipalities have taken an
approach of nonintervention), it still represents a system that enables
different modes of valuation and facilitates individual choice.273
Therefore, from the debate about possible regulation of the P2P
economy, we can glean productive lessons about pluralistic theory and
its limitations.
Pluralistic theory helps us to see the need for regulation and the goals
of such regulation (to preserve adequate and effective choice). In
essence, the theory’s principles demand that rational lawmakers cultivate
multiple choices while balancing conflicting values. In a world where
values are incommensurable and often in conflict, pluralistic theory is
constructive in fleshing out policy responses in the face of specific
needs. Rather than having one resolution, pluralistic theory can be useful
in suggesting that a few options may be the answer. 274
273. As of August 2015, twenty-three U.S. states did not regulate P2P ride services, according to
a report by the National Conference of State Legislatures. Mark Wolf & Amanda Essex, RideSharing and the Future of Transportation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 3, 2015),
www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/08/03/ride-sharing-and-the-future-of-transportation.aspx
[http://perma.cc/WS2W-YHDP].
274. Incommensurability, some argue, presents a dilemma of rational choice when the lawmaker
must decide between two options that are not commensurable. The question of whether
incommensurability (or incomparability) of values precludes rational choice has been the subject of
debate among philosophers for years and is far from being resolved. Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication
and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2001) (“The
problems of incommensurability arise when we try to compare plural, irreducible, and conflicting
values, or choose between options that exhibit or will result in the realization of plural, irreducible,
and conflicting values.”); Ruth Chang, Introduction to Incommensurability, Incomparability, and
Practical Reason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 13–34
(1997) (surveying seven types of leading incomparability arguments and asserting that none is
compelling). For the purpose of this Article, it is unnecessary to examine the various accounts.
Rather, suffice it to note that even if incommensurability does not present a problem of rational
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While pluralistic theory does not entail that all choices are
permissible, it does endorse a wide diversity of ways of life. “It
condemns any law that totally precludes citizens from pursuing one of
the necessary basic goods. It also condemns any law that prohibits
citizens from instantiating a basic good in the only mode of which they
are capable.” 275 But, “[i]t does not tell lawmakers which rationally
permissible resolution they should prefer.” 276
Indeed, the flexibility of the theory is a double-edged sword. As noted
above, the drawback of legal pluralistic theory is that it does not provide
adequate instruction about the specific content of the regulations.
Because the theory is amenable to so many configurations, it is open to
many interpretations and advocates can use the framework to justify
more than one particular policy. For instance, the theory does not give a
definitive answer on whether the San Francisco model for short-term
rentals (more restrictive in its nature) 277 is better than that of Nashville
(less stringent). 278 Similarly, the theory does not provide enough
instruction as to which rights and protections should be included in the
status of dependent contractor. 279
Eventually, a pluralistic framework cannot resolve regulatory debates
solely on its own terms; extrinsic concerns will ultimately drive the
precise regulatory choice. Thus, another difficulty with such a flexible
framework is that the political process can adversely affect it. Dagan
suggests that “[b]oth the existing categories and their underlying values
are always subject to debate and reform, so that some institutions may
fade away while new ones emerge and yet others change their character
or split.” 280 The problem with this idealistic view is that it ignores the
obstacles to public choice, such as the influence of interest groups over

choice, autonomy-based pluralism, as so far developed, also does not tell much about how to
balance and accommodate these competing values.
275. Henry S. Mather, Law-Making and Incommensurability, 47 MCGILL L.J. 345, 378 (2002).
276. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
277. See Office of Short-Term Rental Registry & FAQs, supra note 260.
278. See Short Term Rental Property, supra note 262.
279. As I detail in section II.C, pluralistic theory supports government regulation designed to
create options promoting consumer choice. However, considering the regulatory challenges that the
P2P economy presents, pluralistic theory does not endorse one specific regulatory paradigm, leaving
the logistics up to interpretation. Several scholars and theorists have proposed variations of an
intermediate form of “sharing economy” regulation, in between nonintervention and traditional
regulation. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 177 (proposing an “independent worker” status entailing
discrimination protections, Social Security benefits, etc.); Hass, supra note 225 (proposing a
paradigm, similar to Krueger’s, called “dependent contractor status”).
280. DAGAN, supra note 192, at 182.
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legislators. 281 Because of these political barriers, pluralistic theory—
despite the best-intentioned application of it—can be difficult to
translate into legislation in a way that integrates diverse and balanced
values. 282
The different forces active in the debate about regulating the P2P
economy strongly reflect this limitation. Almost everywhere, the power
of the lobbyist—rather than a commitment to a balance of values—is
what has dictated the outcome of regulatory considerations. Take, for
example, the municipalities that ban short-term rentals—these are cities
in which the hotel industry is powerful. 283 What occurred in Anaheim,
California, the hometown of Disneyland, encapsulates the hotel
industry’s influence in that city vis-à-vis the P2P economy. The
Anaheim city council in June 2016 banned all short-term residential
rentals in the city, giving residents eighteen months to close their
operations or apply for a special license. 284 Anaheim has 153 hotels,
largely to accommodate visitors to Disneyland, Angel Stadium, and the
Anaheim Convention Center. 285 Although Anaheim residents had voiced
concerns about parking problems, noise, and other nuisances caused by
short-term renters, it is also likely that the prominent local hotel industry
exerted pressure on Anaheim city officials to eliminate home-sharing
services as a competitor to the hotels. 286
On the other hand, Silicon Valley companies have been able to exert
an enormous amount of political pressure to protect P2P companies from
regulation; unsuccessful attempts to place modest limitations on Uber
281. Cass Sunstein, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 100 (2015).
282. Cf. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 231, at 1157 (“The winning interest groups are typically
those who can organize most cheaply and effectively to raise and spend money, or to mobilize votes
and other political resources.”).
283. See, e.g., Bianca Barragan, Santa Monica Just Banned Airbnb’s Biggest Moneymakers,
CURBED (May 13, 2015), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2015/05/santa_monica_just_banned
_airbnbs_biggest_moneymakers.php [http://perma.cc/7Q2W-SJTL].
284. Hugo Martin, Anaheim Bans Short-Term Rentals in Residential Areas, L.A. TIMES (July 1,
2016, 11:06 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anaheim-rentals-20160701-snap-story.
html [http://perma.cc/P5SP-QTPP].
285. Hotel Statistics and Frequently Asked Questions, VISIT ANAHEIM, http://visitanaheim.org/
planner-tools/hotel-statistics-and-frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/5HTW-KX4Z].
286. In July 2016, Airbnb sued the city of Anaheim, contesting the fact that the newly passed
Anaheim law imposes fines on Airbnb and other hosting services for not removing, within 10 days,
listings that violate the city ordinance. The Anaheim lawsuit follows on the heels of a similar suit
filed in 2016, in which Airbnb challenged a San Francisco ordinance that imposes fines on Airbnb
for advertising properties violating city regulations on permits and length of stay. Hugo Martin,
Airbnb Sues Anaheim Over Law That Makes the Rental Site Liable for Hosts Who Violate City Law,
L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2016, 3:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnb-anaheim20160728-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/QZP2-TAMP].
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and Airbnb in New York City demonstrate the barriers to regulation
even in the face of policymakers who are trying to achieve a more
balanced solution, one that is consistent with a pluralistic approach. 287
Thus, the structure of the menu of options is often influenced and
essentially determined by lobbyists and by organizational power—rather
than by adherence to pluralistic principles.
Most important, the elasticity of the theory presents a risk that
pluralism will serve as a fig leaf for the adoption of free-market policies.
Because of its plasticity, lawmakers can fill in the menu of options by a
few different structures—including those developed under a neoliberal
approach—while creating a false sense of choice. 288 As stated by Kent
Greenfield, “[s]imply framing a political issue as an issue of choice is a
very powerful and successful persuasive technique, especially in the
United States.” 289 The danger that some advocates will use pluralistic
principles to advance unrestrained free-market principles is genuine
because pluralistic theory is founded on the notion of autonomy and thus
is uniquely susceptible to free-market interpretation. Fundamentally, the
theory proffers that adequate choice allows people to self-govern.
Consequently, the state—with some limitations—should provide people
these options. The essential part of the reasoning adopted by pluralistic
theory—i.e., the significance of choice—resembles much of neoliberal
and libertarian philosophies that emphasize personal liberty above all,
incarnated as the right to choose. 290 However, it bears repeating that
pluralistic theory does not advocate unrestrained choice: in cases of
market failure, harm to third parties, and opportunistic behavior
pluralistic theory endorses a system with some restrictions. 291

287. Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio Administration Dropping Plan for Uber Cap, for Now, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/de-blasio-administrationdropping-plan-for-uber-cap-for-now.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/Q5UY-R5V2]; Tim Logan, At
Airbnb, Growth Brings Scrutiny, Regulation, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2015, 3:00 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnb-20150610-story.html [http://perma.cc/69MA-J6UE].
288. For a definition of neoliberalism, see Christopher Tomlins, The Presence and Absence of
Legal Mind: A Comment on Duncan Kennedy’s Three Globalizations, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 10–12 (2015).
289. Kent Greenfield, Corporate Law and the Rhetoric of Choice, 24 L. & ECON.: TOWARD SOC.
JUST. 69–81 (2009).
290. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE, UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF
CHOICE 10–11, 87 (2015) (discussing the importance of the right to choose in legal and
philosophical traditions).
291. Sunstein, supra note 179, at 849 (“[E]ven a system that generally respects freedom of
contract may block exchanges on several grounds. Typically such grounds involve some form of
market failure . . . .”).
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Despite the fact that pluralistic theory does not validate principles of
unrestrained free market, some of the current debates over the regulation
of the P2P economy demonstrate that pluralism can often give rise to a
free-market approach in disguise. Hence, although some lawmakers have
been able to regulate the P2P economy, in other regions the P2P
economy has no restraints, while its advocates embrace the language of
choice and autonomy. 292
Moreover, because a pluralistic system is, from its nature, grounded
in flexibility and choice, it might lead to entrenchment of existing values
and balances rather than to new ideas. As stated by Jedediah Purdy,
“[B]eing constituted by well-established social practices, [Dagan’s
pluralistic theory] tend[s] toward familiar values and balances of value,
not radical innovations.” 293 And as Kent Greenfield explained:
[T]he rhetoric of choice is an excellent way to support existing
power relationships. The assertion that people acting within such
power relationships are simply choosing their current situation
undermines efforts to change those relationships. The powerful
stay powerful; the weak stay weak. Everyone involved has
chosen their current position, and their choice should be
respected. 294
Indeed, the P2P economy is an example of this tendency to stick to a
familiar balance of values. On the surface, it may seem that the P2P
economy is innovative in the balance of values it embeds because it
augments nonprofessionals’ opportunities to use excess capacity.
However, without regulation to prevent the harms to consumers and
providers, it is often the case that the structure entrenches more
individual-autonomy and free-market values than other values and
principles (it definitely does not advance altruistic values or values
that challenge the status quo of ownership and fair distribution of
resources). When a pluralistic structure emerges, noninterference is
a common result. Moreover, the entrenchment of familiar principles
also characterizes the regulatory debate, which oftentimes operates
in binary terms of “regulation or nothing.” For instance, providers
are either employees or not, with nothing in between; regulation of
short-term rentals as hotels or not at all; regulation of ride-share
providers as traditional taxi drivers or not at all—but regulatory
innovation is too often ignored. Indeed, the pluralistic approach is

292. See, e.g., Flegenheimer, supra note 287.
293. Jedediah Purdy, Some Pluralism About Pluralism: A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s
“Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law”, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 9, 18 (2013).
294. Greenfield, supra note 289, at 63.
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recurrently susceptible to adopting existing patterns rather than
creative solutions.
The P2P economy lays bare these problems. The rhetoric of diverse
choice is compelling and can serve to systematically belie not only the
evasion of regulation but also other societal harms. Pluralistic theory
demands appropriate regulation, but politics, public opinion, and
powerful interest groups can prevent such oversight. The P2P economy
demonstrates the implications that pluralism may well have in “the real
world”—it can and should serve as a meta principle for regulation, but it
also contains the risk of misuse, misinterpretation, and entrenchment of
traditional balance of values.
CONCLUSION
The P2P economy keeps growing at an accelerating pace. It
presents—and will continue to present—critical questions about
regulatory policy. Inevitably, as this business model grows, the calls will
increase for regulatory restraint of the participating firms, as will calls to
let such firms operate with limited regulatory intervention. While I do
not deny the challenges and risks the P2P model entails, I suggest that
we not fall into the hysteria created by interested parties. The P2P
economy is, to be sure, technologically innovative. But the legal and
political questions that the economic model raises are familiar. In fact,
digging more deeply into the structure of the P2P economy shows that
this “new” system only exacerbates already existing questions about
employment structure, ownership, regulation, and fair distribution. As
Tim Wu has articulated, history teaches that although significant
innovations like the radio, movies, and cable television changed our
lives, they did not change “the nature of our existence. For whatever
social transformation any of them might have effected, in the end, each
would take its place to uphold the social structure that has been with us
since the Industrial Revolution.” 295 The P2P economy is no different—it
entrenches and intensifies existing economic and social practices and
approaches.
The fact that the economic model presents familiar tensions does not
mean that it poses no risk of harm to employees, to consumers, and to
established businesses models. Therefore, the unifying, pluralistic
approach this Article has developed provides important insights that
illuminate appropriate regulatory responses. While such a theory does

295. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 6 (2010).
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not offer a concrete answer to every regulatory question in a sectorial
fashion, it helps in identifying basic principles that should apply to each
particular sector. The prism of pluralistic theory offered in this Article
also highlights the bigger picture: it points out the main virtue of the
model as diversifying and enhancing consumers’ and providers’ choices.
The demand for increased choice already justifies the state’s role in
facilitating these options.
However, pluralistic theory also poses a warning. The call for the
state to facilitate access to effective choice is not a call for a Wild West
approach to regulation. Nor does pluralistic theory defend a thin notion
of individual autonomy over other values. A state or municipality that is
committed to pluralism must maintain regulatory boundaries that
advance core democratic values—particularly, substantive notions of
equality and autonomy.
Ultimately, pluralistic theory is frequently mistaken for a champion of
free-market logic—which leads to a noninterventionist approach by the
state. In particular, the plasticity of pluralistic theory—and misguided
notions that its essence is a commitment to individual autonomy—
produces, counterintuitively, a breeding ground for laissez-faire policies.
The P2P economy offers a case study to show how such a hands-off
approach will result—and has resulted—in unfair competition and
possibly the demise of valuable incumbent options, in part resulting
from the intensification of a freelance model of employment. Therefore,
the P2P economy teaches that a pluralistic approach is only pluralistic to
the extent that it advances substantive notions of equality and autonomy.
In the realm of the P2P economy, only efficient protective regulation can
secure this. Absent these safeguards, producers and consumers will be
deprived of some socially valuable choices––the opposite outcome than
what pluralism intends.

